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Summary
While user access control and encryption can protect confidential data from unau-
thorized accesses, they leave evidence of the existence of valuable data, which may
prompt an adversary to adopt unconventional tactics to circumvent the protection,
such as coercing an authorized user into disclosing his access key. A steganographic
file system provides a stronger protection by hiding data’s existence. Access to the
hidden data is possible only if the correct access key is presented. Without it, an
attacker could get no information about whether the hidden data ever exists, even
if he understands the system completely. Without knowing the existence of data,
adversaries would not be motivated to perform attacks, and many security threats
could thus be eliminated. For example, a user under compulsion could plausibly
deny that he possesses the data.
However, the practicality of existing steganographic file systems is limited by
several factors so that it could not be applied to commercial products that are ex-
pected to manage data reliably and efficiently. This thesis is focused on investigat-
ing the methodology of designing effective and efficient steganographic file systems
for various application environments. First, we construct a new practical stegano-
graphic file system that could overcome the weakness of existing systems. Then, we
extend the file system from local machines to open network platforms which face
ix
higher levels of security threats, and a number of security mechanisms are devised
to counter various emerging attacks. We also create a model for steganographic file
system that could be used to evaluate its effectiveness in different application en-
vironments. We have implemented the proposed systems, and conducted extensive
experiments to show their effectiveness and reasonable performance. We believe
our research has richly extended the technology of steganographic file systems, and
has made it practical for real-world applications.
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The advances of the internet and World Wide Web have brought a great innovation
to data management technologies. Data is no longer stored locally and processed
centrally. On the contrary, data is shared in various forms over the internet. It
is distributed among remote storages and processed by remote processors. Thus,
researchers begin to explore new methods to manage the huge amount of data
shared over the internet, in order to use them more efficiently and safely.
Security is increasingly recognized as a key impediment of the emerging data
management technologies, especially when data is shared over the internet and thus
exposed to higher risks. Many research projects are in progress addressing various
problems on data security, such as remote data access control, copyright protection,
privacy protection and trust management. This thesis presents our research on one
of the emerging areas – Steganographic File System, a system that can provide high
confidentiality of data by hiding data’s existence.
21.1 Steganographic File System
User access control and encryption are standard mechanisms for protecting data
from unauthorized accesses. User access control, which is conventionally enforced
by the operating system, enables a data owner to specify who can conduct what
operations (i.e. browse, read or write) on which part of his data. Thereafter the op-
erating system grants user accesses according to his specifications. The technology
of access control has been well studied and has become very sophisticated. There
are a large number of literature [24, 27, 13, 14] addressing its methods, models
and implementations. However, data could not always be protected by the access
control of operating systems, especially when it is transmitted over networks or
stored in public devices such as web cache [29] and shared network storage [44].
When data leaves the protection of access control, it can be encrypted so that it is
only accessible to those who are assigned decryption keys. With the prevalence of
many internet applications, encryption is increasingly being used to protect data
confidentiality [33]. The Encrypting File System (EFS) of MS Windows [16] is a
typical example that combines the mechanisms of access control and encryption.
In practice, user access control and encryption can be inadequate when highly
valuable data is concerned. Access control could be disabled if adversaries manage
to compromise the operating system and access the raw storage directly. In reality,
there have been many reports about large systems being cracked by outside hackers
or betrayed by inside administrators. Furthermore, a centralized access control is
difficult to be established on some distributed systems, e.g. P2P databases [44],
DataGrid [1]. While encryption could complement user access control by restricting
the access privileges to key holders, the encrypted data itself is the evidence of the
existence of valuable data, which would prompt adversaries to attempt to obtain
access through some unconventional tactics. For example, attackers could resort
3to force and compel an authorized user to unlock the encrypted data. Police and
government officer could abuse their authorities and require users to disclose the
decryption keys. A profligate system administrator could be bribed to release the
control of the encrypting system.
To protect data against such unexpected threats, an alternative strategy to
building a “super robust” protection around the data is to hide the data so that
adversaries could not know that it ever exists. Without knowing the existence of
data, an adversary would not be motivated to perform attacks, and many security
threats could thus be eliminated. For instance, a user under compulsion could
plausibly deny the existence of the data. Or he could disclose some less sensitive
data such as his address book, but keep silent on more important ones such as the
budget of his company. The strategy of data hiding inspires us to create a system
that could conceal user selected data automatically so that it remains invisible to
adversaries but easily accessible to authorized users.
Steganography, the art of information hiding, offers a way to achieve this desired
system. It provides a better protection than cryptography alone – while cryptogra-
phy scrambles data so it cannot be understood, steganography goes a step further
by hiding its very existence. In 1998, Ross Anderson et.al proposed the first pro-
totype of steganographic file system [9]. The system hides data files within the
physical storage, and grants access to a hidden file only when the correct access
key is provided. Without it, an adversary could get no information about whether
the data ever exists, even if he understands the software and hardware of the sys-
tem completely. Following that, a number of constructions of steganographic file
system were proposed, and some were implemented into real systems. However, in
order to support the steganographic property, these proposals have had to make a
number of decisions that compromise the practicality of a file system, resulting in
4poor processing performance, low effective space utilization and risk of data cor-
ruption. We still lack a practical steganograhpic file system that could fulfill the
requirements of real-world applications. In addition, the applicability of existing
constructions of steganographic file system is limited to personal computers and
servers with local storage. With recent technology trends like pervasive comput-
ing, peer-to-peer database, data grid, data are increasingly being migrated from
local storage devices to shared storage on open networks. These open platforms
potentially expose data to higher risks. Deploying a steganographic file system on
shared network storage remains an unexplored area.
1.2 Objectives of Research
This thesis aims to investigate the methodology of designing practical stegano-
graphic file systems for various applications that are faced with different levels of
risks. The specific objectives are classified as follows:
• A practical steganographic file system:
To achieve the ability to hide data, the existing constructions of stegano-
graphic file systems have had to make a number of decisions to sacrifice
a certain amount of performance, storage space or data integrity. However,
they either incur huge performance overhead or waste too much storage space.
(Details will be given in chapters 2 and 3.) It is unlikely that these construc-
tions could move beyond niche applications into mass-market commercial file
systems that are expected to manage large volumes of data reliably and effi-
ciently. In our research, we attempt to construct a practical steganographic
file system that could meet the key requirements of real world applications,
without compromising the steganographic property.
5• A model for steganographic file system:
Although there have been a number of proposals of steganographic file sys-
tems, the application scope of these systems were not clearly defined. A
steganographic file system used by a personal computer would be inadequate
for a distributed system whose storage is located remotely and protected
loosely. In different applications, steganographic file system could be chal-
lenged by different threats, which require the system to be constructed ac-
cordingly to provide adequate protection for data. Therefore, it is necessary
to have a system model to formalize the objective of steganographic file sys-
tem and to describe the level of risks faced by any particular application
environment. Such a model could enable us to construct effective stegano-
graphic file systems and to verify whether a construction is adequate (in the
senses of security) for a specific application environment. In our research,
we attempt to create a model for steganographic file system to meet those
demands.
• Steganographic file systems for open platforms:
With the system model, we would like to extend the application of stegno-
graphic file systems from local machine to other various platforms. Recently,
some emerging storage technologies such as SAN, DataGrid, P2P data stor-
age have been increasingly used in real applications. As the storage in these
platforms are located remotely and shared among the public, deploying a
steganographic file system on them would definitely expose the system to
higher security threats. Adversaries can easily obtain the access to those
shared storage and scour for evidence of hidden data. They could even mon-
itor the activities of the storage device to discover useful information. Thus,
previous constructions of steganographic file system would be inadequate for
6a system constructed on those open platforms. In our research, we attempt
to propose a number of new system constructions that could defend against
the additional threats faced by the open platforms.
In order for the designed steganographic file systems to be practical, we would
like them to satisfy the following requirements. First, the system should be able to
hide data files securely, so that attacker could not detect the existence of hidden
file through any possible attacks and analysis. Second, the system should store
data safely, such that data usability would not be easily destroyed by accidents or
tampered by attacker. Third, the system should run efficiently and maintain an
economical storage space utilization. Actually, to realize the data-hiding function,
it would unavoidably impair some other properties of the system, such as perfor-
mance and data integrity. The impairment need to be limited under a tolerable
range, in order to preserve the practicality of the system. As performance is the
most important measure of practicality, good performance would be a key objective
when we design our steganographic file systems.
1.3 Overview of Contributions
To accomplish the above objectives, we propose a system model and a number
of constructions of steganographic file system and experimentally verified their
effectiveness and efficient performance.
First, we propose StegFD, a steganographic file system for local machines such
as PC and server with local storage. As introduced in chapter 3, it not only
overcomes the data loss problems faced by some previous constructions, but also
achieves significant improvements in performance and space utilization than the
existing constructions. We implemented StegFD into a Linux file system, and
7conducted experiment to show its practicality for real world applications. We also
constructed database components such as B-trees on top of StegFD to demonstrate
its potential for database applications.
Second, we create a system model to generalize the objective and design of
steganographic file systems. This model divides the activity space of a file system
into secure and insecure domains, and defines the objective of steganographic file
system as preventing adversaries from detecting hidden data through their observa-
tions in the insecure domain. Based on the model, we also propose a set of metrics
for measuring the security levels of any steganographic file system. The model and
the metrics, introduced in chapter 4, are used in designing the new steganographic
file systems.
Finally, to extend the application of steganographic file system, we propose
three constructions of steganographic file system for open platforms such as SAN,
DataGrid and out-source data storages, which are confronted with higher risks than
local/exclusive systems. The first construction, introduced in chapter 5, is created
to counter update analysis attack, in which attackers attempt to detect hidden file
by observing the updates on the storage. The other two constructions, introduced
in chapter 6, are able to counter traffic analysis attack, which is intended to disclose
hidden files through monitoring and analyzing the data traffics on the storage. One
of the two constructions is unconditionally secure but incurs high overhead. The
other is computationally secure and is able to achieve a better performance. We
have implemented/simulated the proposed systems, and have conducted intensive
experiments to demonstrate their effectiveness and reasonable performance.
We believe that our work has richly extended the technology of steganographic
file system, and made it more practical for real-world applications.
81.4 Thesis Organization
Hereby, we outline the organization of this thesis. The rest of this thesis are orga-
nized in 6 chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the research works that is closely related to
this thesis. They include cyptographic file systems, steganography, steganographic
file system and traffic analysis. They form the background knowledge of this thesis.
Chapter 3 introduces the construction of StegFD, a steganographic file system
we designed for local machines. We will show through experiments that StegFD
achieves significant improvement in both performance and space utilization over
existing constructions and satisfies the criteria of a practical file system that is
expected to manage data reliably and efficiently. We will also present StegBtree, the
B-tree we constructed on top of StegFD, and conduct experiments to demonstrate
the efficacy of StegFD in supporting database applications.
Chapter 4 presents a model of steganographic file system. Various examples are
given to illustrate how to this model is used on different steganographic file systems
designed for different applications. Based on the model, a set of security metrics
are also proposed for measuring the level of protection a steganogrpahic file system
could offer for hidden data.
In chapter 5, we introduce a construction of steganographic file systems for
countering update analysis attacks. It works by conducting dummy updates and
relocating data block periodically. Implementation and experiment results will
show that it incurs only marginal performance penalties over StegFD and meets
the criteria of practical file systems. It is the first step we made to extend stegano-
graphic file systems from local machines to open network platforms, such as SAN
and DataGrid where the storage could be accessed by attackers repeatedly.
Chapter 6 presents two constructions of steganographic file systems for counter-
ing data traffic analysis attacks, which are also potential threats to open network
9platforms. The first construction is called oblivious storage. It is able to remove all
unusual patterns in data traffics, and achieves unconditional security in countering
traffic analysis. The second is called DataCavern, which works by reducing the
accuracy of traffic analysis to a minimum level. It is computationally secure, but
incurs less overhead than oblivious storage. Experiment results will be presented
to show their effectiveness and reasonable performance.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the thesis and discuss directions of the future
research.
Some of the works in this thesis have been published in several international
conferences and journals. The work in chapter 3 has been published in [53] and
[54]. The work in chapter 5 has been published in [72]. The work in chapter 6 have




This chapter introduces some research works closely related to this thesis. We first
give an overview of the existing cryptographic file systems such as EFS for MS
Windows and CFS for Unix, and discuss their constructions and functionalities.
Then we review the history and the state of art of Steganography, the technique we
use to hide data in file systems. Subsequently, we present some existing proposals
of steganographic file system and discuss their effectiveness and weakness. Finally,
we review current works on traffic analysis, which could be used to secure the
steganographic file systems built on open platforms.
2.1 Cryptographic File Systems
While most file systems rely on user access control, which is enforced by operating
systems, to protect data from unauthorized accesses, the functions of user access
control is limited by particular system construction and actual application envi-
ronment. In practice, access control is not necessarily able to ensure the security
of data. For example, for a personal computer shared among multiple users, it is
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Figure 2.1: EFS of MS Windows
users are not around and steals the others’ private data. Laptop and other mobile
computing devices are popular today, and they are more susceptible to theft than
desktop PCs. Once being stolen, its access control could be easily removed through
reverse engineering [39]. In some large systems, data may reside on remote storage
(e.g. SAN, out-sourced storage) that is unreachable by the servers’ access control.
Consequently, it is desirable to encrypt valuable data so that it remains unaccessible
to adversaries when access control does not function. A number of cryptographic
file systems have been proposed to provide such protection. Examples include the
EFS of MS Windows [16] and the CFS of Unix [15].
The Encrypting File System (EFS) of MS Windows enables users to protect
data in PCs and Laptops through encryption, in case attackers could bypass the
operating system to directly read the hard disk. In EFS, files and directories could





Figure 2.2: CFS of Unix
secondary storage. To facilitate key management, both symmetrical cryptography
and asymmetrical cryptography are used. As shown in figure 2.1, files/directories
are always encrypted through symmetrical algorithms such as DES (data encryption
standard). The file encryption keys, in turn, are encrypted by the public key of
each authorized user through an asymmetrical algorithm and kept in the user’s
key list in the storage. When accessing an encrypted file/directory, a user provides
his private key, which could be stored in his smart-card or other private device, to
decrypt the corresponding file encryption key from his key list. Then the file could
be accessed after it is decrypted by the file encrypting key. Without the private
key of authorized users, adversaries are not able to read the file even though they
can access the disk directly. The procedure is automatically performed by the file
system and is transparent to end users.
In contrast to EFS, the Cryptographic File System (CFS) of Unix is not only
used for securing data in PC or laptop, but used for protecting data in a Network
File System (NFS) [64]. As the storage of a file server is usually much more capa-
cious and stable than those of client PCs, people would prefer to store their files
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on server side. A NFS enables users to store files on server side while accessing
them just as they are on the client side. However, if users do not trust a remote file
server to protect the confidentiality of their data, they would choose to encrypt the
files before uploading them to the server. This demand could be met by CFS. As
shown in figure 2.2, CFS stores encrypted files on the remote file server, and keeps
the encryption keys in the client PCs. When a user requests to access a file, CFS
first downloads the file from the server to the client PC, and decrypts it using the
encryption key. Once a file is updated by user, CFS encrypts it before updating
it on the file server. Files keep being encrypted when they are in the server or
being transferred over the network, and thus are resistant to any authorized access
from outside the client PC. Besides CFS, there are a number of cryptographic file
systems designed for remote file servers, such as TCFS (transparent cryptographic
FS) [47, 20], CryptFS [71], SFS (Self-certifying FS) [48]. As their functions are
similar to that of CFS, we ignore their detailed constructions in this thesis.
Cryptographic files systems provide a layer of protection for data when access
control is unavailable. However, this protection could still be inadequate, as en-
crypted files alerts adversaries the existence of valuable data, and prompts them
to adopt unconventional tactics, such as coercing an authorized user into disclos-
ing the encryption keys. The threats could be overcome by steganography, which
intends to provide an extra layer of protection than cryptography by hiding the
existence of data.
2.2 Steganography
Derived from a Greek word meaning “covered writing”, steganography is about the
art of concealing secret message within innocuous looking carriers. Its practice can
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date back many centuries. In the history [37] by Herodotus (a Greek historian
in the 5th century B.C.), to notify Greece the invasion from Xerxes, Demeratus
wrote the message on a wood tablet and covered it with wax on which another-
innocuous-message was written. Then the tablet passed inspection by sentries
without question. An instance of another technique, during the same period, is to
shave off the messenger’s hairs and tattoo the message on his head. When his hair
grows out, the message would be concealed until his head is shaved again. During
World War II, the technology of stegonagraphy had a remarkable development in
the research of military intelligence, where the emerged techniques include invisible
ink [42, 51], microdot [52, 38] and unencrypted cypher [40]. The use of unencrypted
cypher is illustrated by the following message, which was actually composed by
German spy in WWII.
Apparently neutral’s protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored. Is-
man hard hit. Blockade issue affects pretext for embargo on by products,
ejecting suets and vegetable oils.
Taking the second letter in each word, it becomes:
Pershing sails from NY June 1.
Steganography is different from cryptography. The latter intends to prevent ene-
mies from interpreting or modifying the secret, while the former aims to prevent
enemies from detecting the presence of the secret.
Contemporary steganographic technologies have been focused on digital data,
as information are increasingly exchanged in digital forms with the advances of
information technology. Many digital steganographic techniques emerged to hide
secrets into files of image [41], audio [65] and video [35], which usually contain
plenty of room for extra data that will not noticeably affect the end result if some-
one should choose to view or listen to them. For example, secret information could
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Original Image Hidden Image
Figure 2.3: Steganography for Image
be hidden by modifying the insignificant bits of a image without changing its ap-
pearance to human eyes. As illustrated in figure 2.3, removing all but the last 2 bits
of each pixel of the left image and making the resulting image 85 times brighter
results in the image on the right1. As an example of application, a copyrighted
software could be hidden in images, which are then posted on a Web site or a news
group to enable intended recipients to download without leaving evidence to web
masters. A positive application of steganography is to help protect copyrights of
digital products. Namely, copyright information or serial numbers could be hidden
in the digital products through steganographic techniques, so that the producer can
later prove his ownership or trace the distribution and reproduction of his products.
This is also known as digital watermarking [50, 5, 7]. In contrast to steganography,
which purely aims to conceal the embedded information, digital watermarking is




Steganography and digital watermarking have received great interest from the
research community in recent years. The main driving force is the concern over
copyright protection of the increasing amount of data published in digital forms.
Other applications that drive interest in this area include covert or anonymous
communications performed by military and the law enforcement to limit illegal data
sharing over the internet. A number of theories [63, 11] and mathematical models
[17, 73] have been created for steganography, and many techniques [66, 23, 69] have
been proposed in order to hide data more imperceptibly, robustly and efficiently.
A good survey on these techniques could be found in [55].
The art of detecting messages hidden using steganography is called steganalysis
[56, 57], which is comparable to cryptanalysis applied to cryptography. The goal
is to identify suspected packages, determine whether or not they have a secret
embedded into them, and, if possible, recover the secret. After steganography is
applied, some unusual pattern could standout in the hiding data and expose the
possibility of hidden information. For example, if the insignificant bits of an image
have been used to embed extra information, these bits would become statistically
inconsistent with those of a normal image [26]. Then, some statistical analysis could
be conducted on the image to disclose the existence of hidden information. On the
one hand, steganalysis techniques keep emerging for discovering new statistical
artifacts left by information hiding process. On the other hand, steganographic
techniques are also improving, and increasing the difficulty of attacks. It seems that
their competition would last for a long time, just like that between cryptography
and cryptanalysis [10].
In the perspective of information theory, digital steganographic techniques usu-
ally utilize the noise contained by a communication channel to hide extra infor-
mation, such as the least significant bits of an image and audio. The resulting
17
embedding capacity is determined to be restricted under a small limit. Thus, it
would be impractical to use them for securing large volumes of data, e.g. dozens
of data files. While there have been a number of steganographic systems [2, 3]
available on the internet that could be used to secure data files, e.g. DriveCrypt
[10] is capable of hiding a entire disk volume in music files, the resulting overhead
in storage space is unacceptable for a ideal steganographic file system that needs
to hold large volumes of data with high space usage efficiency.
2.3 Steganographic File System
In 1998, Ross Anderson et al. proposed the prototype of steganographic file system
which hide data files directly in disk volumes instead of cover data like image and
audio. The file system allows a user to associate a password with a file or directory
object, such that requests for the object will be granted only if accompanied by the
correct password. An attacker who does not have the matching object name and
password, and lacks the computational power to guess them, cannot deduce from
the snapshot of the raw disk whether the named object exists. Even though it may
not be convincing to claim a empty storage device, it is always feasible to disclose
some less sensitive files and keep silent on the others, as attacker cannot determine
how many data have been hidden in. Such a system could achieve much better
space utilization and performance than the classical steganographic methods that
use image or music to hide data.
In their paper [9], two constructions of such file system are proposed. The first
construction is shown in figure 2.4. It initializes the file system with a number of
randomly generated cover files. When a new object is deposited, it is embedded





Figure 2.4: Construction of StegCover
the associated password. Without the password, it is computationally infeasible
to obtain a correct set of cover files that could construct a hidden object, given a
sufficient large number of cover files. Based on their deduction in linear algebra, for
a system containing n cover files, more than n
2
files could be hidden securely and
safely. Compared to the classical steganography techniques, this scheme entails a
lower space overhead. However, the performance penalty is very high as every file
read or write translates into I/O operations on multiple cover files. (The overhead
would be O(n) times of that in regular file systems.)
In contrast, the second construction in [9] encrypts the blocks of a hidden file
and writes them to absolute disk addresses given by some pseudo-random process,
which is shown in figure 2.5. To reconstruct a hidden file, a user provides the
password as the seed to a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), which in
turn generates a sequence of addresses pointing to the data blocks that compose
the file. An implementation based on the second scheme was reported in [49].
The problem with this scheme is that different files could map to the same disk
addresses, thus causing one to overwrite the other. While the risk can be controlled
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Figure 2.5: Construction of StegRand
by replicating the hidden files and by limiting the number of hidden files, it cannot
be eliminated completely, and the resulting storage space utilization has also to be
limited to a very low level.
In [34], Hand and Roscoe extended the scheme to on a peer-to-peer platform. In
order to provide better resilience against address collision, it utilizes the information
dispersal algorithm (IDA) [59] instead of simple replication. Using IDA, a file owner
chooses two numbers m ≥ n and encodes the hidden file into m cipher-files such
that any n of them suffice to reconstruct the hidden file. However, this is achieved
at the expense of higher storage and read/write overheads, and there is still the
possibility of data loss when more than (m - n) cipher-files get corrupted.
Due to the large performance/space overhead and the risks of data corruption, it
is unlikely that these constructions of steganographic file system could move beyond
niche applications into mass-market commercial file systems that are expected to
manage large volume of data reliably and efficiently.
2.4 Traffic Analysis and Related Techniques
As what will be discussed in chapter 5 and chapter 6, when constructing a stegano-
graphic file system on a shared network storage, we need to prevent an attacker,
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who is monitoring the storage, from detecting the existence of hidden files by an-
alyzing the patterns of the update or data traffic activities. This is the traffic
analysis problem [60]. Traffic analysis has been studied extensively in the context
of privacy-providing systems – a user would like to reserve his private informa-
tion while using the system, and an attacker attempts to disclose the information
through monitoring and analyzing the data traffics over networks. A typical exam-
ple is the MIX networks [32, 8], which is intended to enable user to anonymously
send message to a recipient. To achieve that, the message is sent through a set of
randomly selected nodes in a route, so that the observer cannot determine where
is the source or the destination of the message. However, attackers could still be
able to reconstruct the route by analyzing the timings and patterns of the network
traffics [67]. Then, a number of counter measures were proposed, such as time
padding, inserting dummy messages [12], etc.
Some other related techniques that could be adopted to counter traffic analy-
sis include Secure Multi Party Computation (SMPC) [31], Private Information
Retrieval (PIR)[22], oblivious RAM [30], oblivious transfers [58] and etc.. While
they use different mechanisms to accomplish the peculiar objectives of individ-
ual systems, all serve to prevent secret information from being released to adver-
saries through the data traffic or access patterns. Intuitively, the traffic analysis
on steganographic file system would apply steganalysis techniques to data traffics
to discover unusual patterns that indicate the existence of hidden data. Thus, the
counter measures should be able to remove all the statistically observable artifacts
incurred by hidden data from data traffics. Two privacy protection mechanisms
that could offer such ability are oblivious RAM and private information retrieval
(PIR).
PIR enables users to privately retrieve their information from a secondary stor-
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age system, such as a database. With such a mechanism, user data are stored into
multiple databases that are not aware of each other, so that a user can retrieve
data without revealing them. However, all the existing schemes of PIR [28, 18]
only concentrate on reducing the communication complexity, but ignore the I/O
overheads. Specifically, most of them need to scan the entire storage volume for
every query, and are too expensive for a steganographic file system that is expected
to manage data efficiently.
Oblivious RAM is a tamper-resistant cryptographic processor that serves to
protect code privacy and prohibit software copyright violation. Even an attacker
who can look into the memory and monitor the memory accesses (reads or writes)
cannot gain any useful information about what is being computed and how it is
being computed. In [30], the oblivious RAM’s processing overhead is reduced to
O((log t)3) where t is the number of computation steps of the RAM. One of our
proposed counter-measures against traffic analysis, oblivious storage (see chapter
6), is inspired by the oblivious RAM.
As the existing techniques on traffic analysis were not specially proposed for
steganographic file systems, they usually incur unnecessary cost that would com-
promise the practicality of a file system. In this thesis, we will propose a number
of techniques to deal with the traffic analysis on steganographic file systems.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced cyptographic file system, steganographic techniques,
existing work on steganographic file system and the related works on traffic analysis.
They form the background knowledge of the technique of steganographic file system.
Some schemes and methods used in this thesis are actually adapted from them.
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Chapter 3
StegFD: A Local Steganographic File
System
This chapter introduces StegFD, a local steganographic file systems designed to
overcome the weakness of the previous systems like StegCover and StegRand.
3.1 Introduction
There have been a number of proposals for steganographic file systems in recent
years [9, 49]. To support the steganographic property, these proposals have had
to make a number of design decisions that compromise the practicality of the file
systems, resulting in large increases in I/O operations, low effective storage space
utilizations, and even risk of data loss as the file system itself could write over
hidden files. With such compromises, it is unlikely that the proposed schemes
could move beyond niche applications into mass-market commercial file systems
that are expected to manage large volumes of data reliably and efficiently.
In this chapter, we introduce StegFD, a scheme to implement a steganographic
file system on a local machine, e.g. a personal computer, a server with local storage.
StegFD enables users to selectively hide their directories and files. It grants access
to a hidden directory/file only if the correct access key is supplied. Without it an
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adversary would not be able to deduce their existence, even he understands the
hardware and software of the file system completely, and is able to scour through
its data structures and the content on the raw disks. To ensure its practicality,
StegFD is designed to meet three key requirements – it should not lose data or
corrupt files, it should offer plausible deniability to owners of protected directo-
ries/files, and it should minimize any processing and space overheads. StegFD
excludes hidden directories and files from the central directory of the file system.
Instead, the metadata of a hidden directory/file object is stored in a header within
the object itself. The entire object, including header and data, is encrypted to
make it indistinguishable from unused blocks to an observer. Only an authorized
user with the correct access key can compute the location of the header, and ac-
cess the directory/file through the header. We have implemented StegFD on the
Linux operating system, and extensive experiments confirm that StegFD indeed
produces an order of magnitude improvements in performance and/or space uti-
lization over the existing schemes. We have also extended this StegFD to address
how B-trees can be supported in a steganographic file system. We introduce two
schemes for implementing steganographic B-trees, and also report a performance
study to evaluate the proposed B-tree schemes.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3 introduces
our StegFD file system, together with a discussion on some potential limitations
of StegFD and ways to work around them. Section 4 presents our StegFD im-
plementation on the Linux operating system, and profiles StegFD’s performance
characteristics. In Section 5, we present extensions to StegFD to support B-trees.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes this chapter and discusses its further extensions.
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3.2 StegFD: Steganographic File Driver
In this section, we present StegFD, a practical scheme for implementing a general-
purpose steganographic file system. The scheme is designed to satisfy three key
objectives: (a) StegFD should not lose data or corrupt files. (b) StegFD should
hide the existence of protected directories and files from users who do not possess
the corresponding access keys, even if the users are thoroughly familiar with the
implementation of the file system. (c) StegFD should minimize any processing and
space overheads.
To hide the existence of a directory/file, it should be excluded from the central
directory of the file system. Instead, StegFD maintains the hidden directory/file
object’s structure, eg. its inode table, in a header within the object itself. Similarly,
all records pertaining to the object, for example usage statistics, should also be
isolated within the object instead of being written to common log files. The entire
object, including header and data, is encrypted to make it indistinguishable from
unused blocks in the file system to an unauthorized observer. Only a user with the
access key is able to locate the file header and, from there, the hidden directory/file.
To simplify the description, we will henceforth focus on hidden files, with the
understanding that the discussion applies equally to hidden directories.
3.2.1 File System Construction
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the StegFD file system. The storage space is par-
titioned into standard-size blocks, and a bitmap tracks whether each block is free
or has been allocated – a 0 bit indicates that the corresponding block is free, while
a 1 bit signifies a used block. All the plain files are accessed through the central






























Figure 3.1: Overview of the StegFD File System
istered with the central directory, though the blocks occupied by them are marked
off in the bitmap to prevent the space from being re-allocated.
When the file system is created, randomly generated patterns are written into all
the blocks so that used blocks do not stand out from the free blocks. Furthermore,
some randomly selected blocks are abandoned by turning on their corresponding
bits in the bitmap. These abandoned blocks are intended to foil any attempt to
locate hidden data by looking for blocks that are marked in the bitmap as having
been assigned, yet are not listed in the central directory. The higher the number of
abandoned blocks, the harder it is to succeed with such a brute-force examination
for hidden data. However, this has to be balanced with space utilization consid-
erations. In practice, the number of abandoned blocks may be determined by an
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Figure 3.2: Structure of Hidden File
StegFD additionally maintains one or more dummy hidden files that it updates
periodically. This serves to prevent an observer from deducing that blocks allocated
between successive snapshots of the bitmap that do not belong to any plain files
must hold hidden data. The number of dummy hidden files can also be set manually
or automatically. Note that dummy files do not eliminate the need for abandoned
blocks – whereas dummy files are maintained by StegFD and could be vulnerable to
an attacker with administrator privileges, abandoned blocks offer extra protection
because they cannot be traced.
In the example in Figure 3.1, the file system contains two hidden user files, a
dummy hidden file and three plain files, each of which comprises one or more disk
blocks. There are also abandoned blocks scattered across the disk.
The structure of a hidden file is shown in Figure 3.2. Each hidden file is accessed
through its own header, which contains three data structures: (a) A link to an inode
table that indexes all the data blocks in the file. (b) A signature that uniquely
identifies the file. (c) A linked list of pointers to free blocks held by the file.
All the components of the file, including header and data, are encrypted with an
access key to make them indistinguishable from the abandoned blocks and dummy
hidden files to unauthorized observers.
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Since the hidden file is not recorded in the central directory, StegFD must be
able to locate the file header using only the (physical) file name and access key.
During file creation, StegFD supplies a hash value computed from the file name
and access key as seed to a pseudorandom block number generator, and checks each
successive generated block number against the bitmap until the file system finds a
free block to store the header. Once the header is allocated, subsequent blocks for
the file can be assigned randomly from any free space by consulting the bitmap,
and linked into the file’s inode table. To prevent overwriting due to different users
issuing the same file name and access key, the physical file name is derived by
concatenating the user id with the complete path name of the file.
To retrieve the hidden file, StegFD once again inputs the hash value computed
from the file name and access key as seed to the pseudorandom block number
generator, and looks for the first block number that is marked as assigned in the
bitmap and contains a matching file signature. The initial block numbers given by
the generator may not hold the correct file header because they were unavailable
when the file was created. Thus the signature, created by hashing the file name
with the access key, is crucial for confirming that the correct file header has been
located. To avoid false matches, the file signature has to be a long string. A one-
way hash function is used to generate the signature so that an attacker cannot
infer the access key from the file name and the signature. Examples of such hash
functions include SHA [6] and MD5 [61].
Another characteristic of a hidden file is that it may hold on to free blocks.
Here the intention is to deter any intruder who starts to monitor the file system
right after it is created, and hence is able to eliminate the abandoned blocks from
consideration, then continues to take snapshots frequently enough to track block
allocations in between updates to the dummy hidden files. Such an intruder would
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probably be able to isolate some of the blocks that are assigned to hidden files. By
maintaining an internal pool of free blocks within a hidden file, StegFD prevents the
intruder from distinguishing blocks that contain useful data from the free blocks.
When a hidden file is created, StegFD straightaway allocates several blocks to
the file. These blocks, tracked through a linked list of pointers in the file header,
are selected randomly from the free space in the file system so as to increase the
difficulty in identifying the blocks belonging to the file and the order between them.
As the file is extended, blocks are taken off the linked list randomly for storing data
or inodes until the number of free blocks falls below a preset lower bound, at which
time the internal pool is topped up. Conversely, when the file is truncated, the freed
blocks are added to the internal pool until it exceeds an upper bound, wherein some
of the free blocks are returned to the file system.
3.2.2 Directory Support for File Sharing
While StegFD incorporates several features to safeguard files that are hidden by a
user, it is most effective in a multi-user environment. This is because when many
blocks are allocated for hidden files, an attacker may be able to estimate the amount
of useful data in these files, but there is no way to ascertain just how much of that
belong to any particular user. Hence a user acting under coercion is likely to have
a lot of leeway in denying the existence of valuable data that is accessible by him.
One of the natural requirements of a multi-user system is the sharing of hidden
files among users. As a user may want to share only selected files, StegFD secures
each hidden file with a randomly generated file access key (FAK) rather than the
user’s access key, so that the file name and FAK pair can be shared among multiple
users.
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Figure 3.3: Directory Structure of StegFD
track their hidden files. StegFD allows a user to own several user access keys
(UAK). For each UAK, StegFD maintains a directory of file name and FAK pairs
for all the hidden files that are accessed with that UAK. The entire directory is
encrypted with the UAK and stored as a hidden file on the file system. The UAKs
could be managed independently, for example stored in separate smart cards for
maximum security. Alternatively, to make the file system more user-friendly, UAKs
belonging to a user could be organized into a linear access hierarchy such that when
the user signs on at a given access level, all the hidden files associated with UAKs
at that access level or lower are visible. Thus, under compulsion, the user could
selectively disclose only a subset of his UAKs. Without knowing how many UAKs
the user owns, the attacker would not be able to deduce that the user is holding
back some UAKs.
To share a hidden file with another user, the owner has to release its file name
and FAK pair to the recipient. Since neither the owner nor StegFD has the UAK
of the recipient, the sharing cannot be effected automatically. Instead, the file
information is encrypted with the recipient’s public key, and the resulting ciphertext
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Figure 3.4: File Sharing in StegFD
then decrypts the ciphertext with his private key and associates the hidden file with
his own UAK, at which time the file information is added to the UAK’s directory
and the ciphertext is destroyed. The practice of transmitting the file information
is a relatively weak point in StegFD, as the ciphertext could alert an attacker to
the existence of the hidden file. However, as each hidden file has its own FAK,
a compromised ciphertext does not expose other hidden files in StegFD. The file
sharing mechanism is summarized in Figure 3.4.
Finally, when the owner of a hidden file decides to revoke the sharing arrange-
ment, StegFD first makes a new copy with a fresh FAK and possibly a different file
name, then removes the original file to invalidate the old FAK. The outdated FAK
will be deleted from the directories of other users the next time they log in with
31
their UAKs.
3.2.3 File System Backup and Recovery
Since the hidden files in StegFD are shielded from even the system administrator,
the usual method of backing up a file by copying its content no longer works for
them. Yet a brute force approach of saving the image of the entire file system
would be too time-consuming, in view of the ever-growing capacity of modern
storage devices.
StegFD saves the image of only those blocks that are allocated in the bitmap
but do not belong to any plain file in the central directory. Plain files are still
backed up by copying their content. This limits the overhead of StegFD to the
space that is occupied by abandoned blocks, dummy hidden files, and free blocks
held within the user hidden files.
To recover a damaged file system, StegFD first restores the image of the aban-
doned and hidden blocks to their original addresses. This is necessary because the
hidden files contain their own inode tables that cannot be adjusted by the recovery
process to reflect new block assignments. The plain files are reconstructed last,
possibly at new block addresses.
Many existing file systems provide data recovery tools to fix accidental errors.
For example, if the file header is lost or corrupted, a regular file system can always
track the lost chains and recover the lost file. StegFD can also support recovery by
introducing some redundancy: The header of a hidden file can be replicated and
placed in pseudo-random locations derived from its FAK. Thus, if the file header
is corrupted, the replica can be retrieved to recover the hidden file. Additionally, a
signature can be inserted in each data block, so that if necessary a hidden file can
be recovered by scanning the disk volume for blocks with matching signatures.
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3.2.4 Potential Limitations of StegFD
While StegFD offers an extra feature over a “vanilla” file system in hiding the
existence of protected files, this is achieved at the expense of introducing a number
of limitations:
• All the hidden files must be restored together; it is not possible to roll-back
hidden files selectively. A work-around is to restore all the hidden files to a
temporary volume, from where the user can copy the required files over to
the permanent StegFD volume.
• The file system is unable to defragment hidden files to improve their retrieval
efficiency, without cooperation from the users who possess the file access keys.
This is a common problem among secure file system products. A solution is
to employ a key recovery mechanism (e.g. [70]) that allows a user to deposit a
copy of his UAK with several managers through a secret sharing scheme. To
reconstruct the UAK subsequently, concurrence of some minimum number of
those managers is needed, thus ensuring the security of the UAK.
• The file system cannot remove hidden files belonging to expired user accounts
without cooperation from the users who possess the file access keys. Again,
this limitation is common for secure file system products, and can be ad-
dressed by a key recovery mechanism.
3.3 System Implementation and Performance Eval-
uation
This section begins with a description of an implementation of StegFD, then pro-
ceeds to present results from some of the more interesting experiments.
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Figure 3.5: StegFD Implementation
3.3.1 System Implementation
We have implemented StegFD on the Linux kernel 2.4; the code is available for pub-
lic download at the StegFD web site (http://xena1.ddns.comp.nus.edu.sg/Secure-
DBMS/). We have used SHA256 [6] as the pseudorandom number generator for
locating the hidden object (the seed is recursively hashed to generate the pseudo-
random numbers), and the block cipher for encrypting data blocks is based on AES
[4]. Figure 3.5, adapted from [49], shows the system architecture. It is implemented
as a file system driver between the virtual file system (VFS) and the buffer cache in
the Linux kernel, alongside other file system drivers like Ext2fs [19] and Minix [68].
StegFD implements all the standard file system APIs, such as open() and read(),
so it is able to support existing applications that operate only on plain files. In
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Parameter Value
Model of the CPU Intel Pentium 4
Clock speed of the CPU 1.6 GHz
Type of the hard disk IBM ATA/IDE
Capacity of the hard disk 60 GB
Table 3.1: Physical Resource Parameters
Parameter Default
Size of each disk block 1 KBytes
Size of each file (1, 2] MBytes
Capacity of the disk volume 25 GBytes
Number of files in the file system 2000
File access pattern Interleaved
Number of concurrent users 1
Table 3.2: Workload Parameters
addition, StegFD introduces several steganographic file system APIs for creating
hidden directories/files, converting between hidden and plain directories/files, re-
vealing hidden directories/files, and sharing hidden directories/files. Details of the
API can also be found at the StegFD web site.
3.3.2 Experiment Set-Up
To evaluate the performance of StegFD, we ran a series of experiments with various
workloads on an Intel PC. The key parameters of the hardware are listed in Table
3.1, while Table 3.2 summarizes the workload parameters. Note in particular that
we expect many file servers to use a block size of 1 KBytes – the allocation unit
is 1 KBytes in NTFS, and 512 Bytes or 1 KBytes in Unix – hence we set that as
the default. However, we will also experiment with larger block sizes to study how
StegFD would perform with other file systems (the allocation units in FAT16 and
FAT32 are 32 KBytes and 8 KBytes, respectively).
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For comparison purposes, we shall benchmark against the native file system in
Linux and the two schemes proposed in [9] – StegCover that hides each file among 16
cover files as recommended by the authors, and StegRand that writes a hidden file
to absolute disk addresses given by a pseudorandom process and replicates the file
to reduce data loss from overwritten blocks (see the Section 3 of Chapter 2). As for
the native Linux file system, its performance provides an upper bound to what any
file protection scheme can achieve at best; we shall examine two separate cases –
CleanDisk and FragDisk. With CleanDisk, files are loaded onto a freshly formatted
disk volume and occupy contiguous blocks; this is intended to highlight the best
possible performance limit. In contrast, FragDisk reflects a well-used disk volume
where files are fragmented, and is simulated by breaking each file into fragments of
8 blocks.
The primary performance metrics for the experiments are: (a) the effective
space utilization, i.e., the aggregate size of the unique data files divided by the
capacity of the disk volume; (b) the file access time, defined as the time taken to
read or write a file, averaged over 1000 observations (the normalized file access
time is the file access time divided by the file size); (c) the CPU consumption,
defined as the CPU’s non-idle time; and (d) the CPU utilization, defined as the
CPU consumption divided by the total elapsed time.
3.3.3 Effective Space Utilization
We begin our investigation with an experiment to profile the space utilization of the
steganographic file systems. Here the size of the disk volume is set to 25 GBytes,
while the file sizes vary uniformly between 1 and 2 MBytes.
Let us first examine the StegCover scheme. Since the cover files must be big
enough to accommodate the largest data file, the most efficient space utilization
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is achieved by setting the cover files to 2 MBytes. With file sizes in the range
of (1, 2] MBytes, each set of cover files can be 50% to 100% utilized, thus giving
an average space utilization of 75%. While we can probably improved upon the
original StegCover scheme by packing several files into each set of cover files, and
by letting large files span multiple sets of cover files, that would introduce indexing
complexities and performance penalties, and is beyond the scope of our work.
Turning our attention to StegRand, we note that its resilience against data
corruption can be improved by file replication. Its effective space utilization is
the space utilization when the first data block is irrecoverably corrupted – that is
when StegRand has just passed the limit where it can safely recover all its hidden
files, and beyond which more files will be corrupted and lost permanently. As
reported in [9], with a replication factor of 4, the space utilization can only reach
7% for a disk with 1,000,000 blocks. Experiments on our disk volume comprising
25,000,000 blocks show that the average space utilization cannot exceed 4% even
with a replication factor of 16. It is reasonable that larger storage space produces
lower space utilizations since block corruptions occur more frequently in a disk
volume made up of more blocks than one with fewer blocks.
Finally, we consider the StegFD scheme. Here, the only storage overheads are
incurred by the abandoned blocks, the dummy hidden files, the inode structures,
and the free blocks held within the hidden files. Since there is no danger of data
blocks being overwritten, all of the remaining space can be used for useful data.
Assuming that the percentage of abandoned blocks in the disk volume is 1%, the
dummy hidden files occupy another 1% of disk space, and each hidden file contains
a maximum of 10 free blocks, StegFD is able to consistently achieve more than 80%
space utilization.
To summarize, we have arrived at a couple of observations. First, the StegCover
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scheme cannot achieve full space utilization without extending it to perform file
packing and spanning. Second, StegRand works reliably only when the disk volume
is very sparsely populated; file servers that are typically formatted with a 1 KByte
block size can achieve only 4% space utilization for a 25 GByte volume, and less for
larger disks, before data corruption sets in. Third, the proposed StegFD is capable
of achieving higher space utilizations than StegCover, and is at least 20 times more
space-efficient than StegRand.
3.3.4 Performance Analysis
Having demonstrated StegFD’s superior space utilization, we now focus on its per-
formance characteristics. This experiment is intended to study how well it works,
relative to the native file system and the other steganographic schemes, on file
servers where I/O operations from several users or applications are interleaved.
For StegCover, the number of cover files is 16, while a replication factor of 4 is used
for StegRand, both according to the authors’ recommendation in [9]. The disk
volume size and the block size are set to 25 GBytes and 1 KBytes, respectively,
while the file sizes vary uniformly between 1 and 2 MBytes.
Figures 3.6(a) and (b) give the read and write access times, respectively, for
the various file systems. Since StegCover spreads each hidden file among multiple
cover files, every file operation translates to several disk I/Os, hence its read and
write access times are very much worse than the rest. As for StegRand, its read
performance is no better than StegFD’s due to the need to hunt for an intact replica
when the primary copy of a file is found to be corrupted, whereas the write access
times are much worse because all the replicas must be updated.
As for StegFD, its access times are slower than those of CleanDisk and FragDisk
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Figure 3.7: Sensitivity to File Size
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blocks, particularly for read operations that benefit from the read-ahead feature
of the disk. However, the differentiation diminishes with increased workload, as
file operations become increasingly interleaved. In fact, StegFD matches both
CleanDisk and FragDisk from 16 concurrent users onwards for read operations.
For write operations, the performance of StegFD also converges toward those of
CleanDisk and FragDisk with more concurrent users. Finally, the relative trade-
offs between the various schemes are independent of the file size, as shown in Figures
3.7(a) and (b) (for single user context).
In summary, this experiment shows that both of the previous steganographic
schemes introduce very high read and/or write penalties and are not suitable for file
servers that must handle heavy loads. In contrast, StegFD is a practical stegano-
graphic file system that delivers similar performance to the native Linux file system
in a multi-user environment.
3.3.5 Sensitivity to File Access Patterns
The next experiment is aimed at discovering the sensitivity of the various file sys-
tems’ performance to the file access pattern. Specifically, we are looking at a
situation where each file is retrieved in its entirety before the next file is opened, as
may happen in a very lightly loaded file server. We fix the number of concurrent
users at 1, while maintaining the other workload parameters at their settings in
the previous experiment.
Figures 3.8(a) and (b) show the read and write access times for the various
file systems, with the file size fixed at 1 MBytes. Here, CleanDisk delivers the
best performance as expected since all its files occupy contiguous blocks. FragDisk,
which breaks each file into fragments of 8 blocks, is slower due to the overhead






















































(a) Read (b) Write
Figure 3.8: Serial File Operations
fragmented, its performance would gradually degrade to that of StegFD even in
single-user environments where file operations are not interleaved. The difference
in performance is more pronounced with small block sizes where FragDisk has to
perform more fragment seeks, and StegFD and StegRand incur more block seeks.
This experiment demonstrates that while StegFD achieves similar performance
to the Linux file system in a multi-user environment, the penalty that StegFD
incurs in hiding data files is noticeable when the load is so light that file I/Os
are not interleaved. Even then, StegFD still delivers acceptable access times and
outperforms the previous steganographic schemes significantly.
3.3.6 CPU Usage
The last set of experiments aims to evaluate the CPU usage of the various file sys-













































(a) CPU Consumption (b) CPU Utilization
Figure 3.9: CPU Usage
and utilization for retrieving 1-MByte data files.
As shown in Figure 3.9(a), StegCover has the highest CPU consumption since
it needs to retrieve 16 times more data than the other schemes. As StegRand and
StegFD need to execute some cryptographic functions in each data retrieval or
update, they incur more CPU overhead than CleanDisk and FragDisk. However,
at low concurrency, StegRand and StegFD have lower CPU utilizations because
their I/O costs are higher than those of CleanDisk and FragDisk. Nevertheless,
with the exception of StegCover, the CPU utilizations of the tested file systems are
no more than 10% as shown in Figure 3.9(b). This confirms that I/O cost is still
the dominant performance determinant.
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3.4 Steganographic B-Tree
Having devised a steganographic file system and demonstrated that it incurs only
marginal access time and space utilization penalties over conventional file systems,
we are keen to investigate its efficacy in supporting specialized applications; in
particular, relational DBMSs that must be highly optimized. In this section, we
study how efficiently operations can be carried out on B-trees, one of the key index
structures in relational DBMSs, within a StegFD volume.
3.4.1 Construction of Steganographic B-Tree
A straightforward way to hide the existence of a database is to install a conventional
DBMS on a StegFD volume. This causes the DBMS to store the database, including
its B-tree indices, as one or more hidden files that are managed by StegFD. The
advantage is that this entails no modification to the DBMS. However, if there is a
mismatch in the block sizes of the DBMS and StegFD, StegFD would either need
multiple I/O operations to satisfy each node access, or it would fetch more data
than necessary each time. Even when the DBMS is configured with the same block
size as StegFD, the node boundaries in the DBMS may not align with the block
boundaries in StegFD. Hence there is an expected performance degradation. In
an attempt to overcome this penalty, we propose two schemes for implementing
B-trees directly in a steganographic disk volume.
In the first scheme, each B-tree begins with a header as illustrated in Figure
3.10(a). The first two structures in the header, signature and free blocks list, work
the same way as with hidden files (see Section 3.1). Unlike a hidden file that links
its data blocks in a linear chain, here the index nodes are linked into a B-tree
structure. Having located the B-tree through its header, operations like insertion,
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search and deletion can be carried out according to the usual algorithms. We denote
this scheme as StegBtree.
The second scheme for implementing a steganographic B-tree is similar to
StegBtree, except that the child pointers in the non-leaf nodes are not stored ex-
plicitly. Instead, the address of a node Pi is calculated on-the-fly, by applying a
hash function on the corresponding index entry Ki, the node’s level number and
the file access key, i.e.,
 P0 = HASH(NodeAddress, level#, FAK)Pi = HASH(Ki, level#, FAK) for all i > 0
where NodeAddress is the physical address of P0’s father node. The address of
the root node is calculated by applying the hash function to the root id, which
is recorded in the file header. Address collisions that may be encountered by the
B-tree nodes are handled the same way as with file headers in StegFD. This pointer-
less scheme, StegBtree-, is shown in Figure 3.10(b). The space saving from omitting
the child pointers allows each non-leaf node to hold more keys, leading to a higher
fan-out and fewer nodes, which can potentially speed up operations on the B-tree.
Algorithms for node allocation, search and insertion on StegBtree- are given in
Figure 3.12. Function allocate() allocates a new node to StegBtree-. It repeatedly
applies a hash function on the input arguments until a free page is found, and
returns this page as the new node. Function locate() makes use of the same hash
function and the same procedure as allocate() to locate an existing node from the
storage space. The procedure search() for StegBtree- is similar to that of a regular
B+-tree, except that it does not use pointers to locate tree nodes, but uses the
function locate() to calculate the node addresses instead. The procedure insert()






















Figure 3.10: Structure of StegBtree(-)
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func allocate (K, level#, FAK) returns address
P = HASH (K, level#, FAK);
loop
if Block *P is a free block, then
return P ;
else,
P = HASH (P );
end loop;
endfunc
func locate (K, level#, FAK) returns address
P = HASH (K, level#, FAK);
loop
if Block *P ’s signature is correct, then
return P ;
else,
P = HASH (P );
end loop;
endfunc
func search (nodeaddress, K) returns address
// level# is the current level number;
// Km is the last entry in this node;
if *nodeaddress is a leaf, return nodeaddress;
else,
if K< K1 then
P = locate (nodeaddress, level#-1, FAK);
else if K ≥ Km then
P = locate (Km, level#-1, FAK);
else,
find i such that Ki ≤ K < Ki+1;
P = locate (Ki, level#-1, FAK);
return search (P , K);
endfunc
proc range search (K1, K2, (out) results)
P1 = search (root, K1);
begin from P1, and follow the leaf link list until get
P2 which contains the 1st entry greater than K2;
add all the leaf nodes between P1 and P2 to results;
endproc
Figure 3.11: Algorithm: Search StegBTree-
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proc insert (nodeaddress, entry, newchildentry)
// insert ’entry’ into subtree with root ’*nodeaddress’;
// degree is d; ’newchildentry’ is null initially, and
// null upon return unless child is split;
// level# is the current level number;
if *nodeaddress is a non leaf node, say N,
if K< K1 then
P = locate (nodeaddress, level#-1, FAK);
else if K ≥ Km then
P = locate (Km, level#-1, FAK);
else,
find i such that Ki ≤ K < Ki+1;
P = locate (Ki, level#-1, FAK);
insert(P , entry, newchildentry);
if newchildentry is null, return;
else,
if N has space,
put newchildentry on it,
set newchildentry to null, return;
else, // split N:
first d key values stay,
N2 = allocate (Kd+1, level#, FAK),
last d keys move to new node N2;
newchildentry = < Kd+1 >;
if N is the root,
A0= allocate (New Root ID, level#+1, FAK),
insert < Kd+1 > into *A0;
replace Root ID with New Root ID;
// relocate the 1st node of each level:
B = nodeaddress;
for i = level# to 0, loop
A1 = allocate (A0, i, FAK);
copy *B to *A1, release *B ;
B = locate (B, i-1, FAK), A0=A1;
end loop;
return;
else if *nodeaddress is leaf node, say L,
if L has space,
put entry on it and return;
else,
split L: first d entries stay,
L2 = allocate (Kd+1, 0, FAK),
rest move to brand new node L2;
newchildentry = < Kd+1 >;
return;
endproc
Figure 3.12: Algorithm: Insert a Node in StegBTree-
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Parameter Default
Table size 35,000 Tuples
Tuple size 256 Bytes
Node size 4 KBytes
Key size 16 Bytes
Pointer size 4 Bytes
Table 3.3: B-Tree Parameters
function to create new nodes for the B-tree. As Figure 3.12 shows, when a node is
split during insertion, the middle entry is passed to the allocate() function to create
a new node, and thereafter all the index entries in the original node with larger key
values than the middle entry are shifted to the new node. As all the existing nodes
of StegBtree- remain unchanged during insertion, it does not incur extra overhead.
Only when the root node is split and the tree grows up a level, it takes a bit more
effort to reorganize the StegBtree-. In that case, a new root node is allocated by
passing a new root id to the allocate() function. The update of root id requires the
first node of each level of the StegBtree- to be reallocated accordingly, as its address
is directly or indirectly determined by the root id through the hash function.
To provide native support for B-tree indices in StegFD, we have added two new
sets of APIs, one for StegBtree and the other for StegBtree-. The APIs can be found
at the StegFD web site (http://xena1.ddns. comp.nus.edu.sg/SecureDBMS/).
3.4.2 Experiments
To investigate the efficacy of StegBtree and StegBtree-, we compare them with the
alternatives of (a) constructing the B-trees directly on a raw disk (Btree), and (b)
storing the B-trees in hidden files on a StegFD volume (Btree on StegFD). Table
3.3 summarizes the experiment parameters. The physical resource and workload





















Figure 3.13: Sensitivity to Space Utilization
Sensitivity to Space Utilization
We begin the profiling of the steganographic B-tree schemes by evaluating their
sensitivity to the utilization level of the StegFD volume. Figure 3.13 shows the
average access time of 400 exact-match queries for the various B-tree schemes.
As expected, Btree on StegFD is much slower than the other schemes because it
has a different node size from StegFD’s block size, and the node boundaries are not
aligned with StegFD’s block boundaries, thus incurring multiple I/O operations for
each node access. For StegBtree, there is some overhead in processing the header
block to locate the B-tree, but the resulting penalty over Btree is well within 20%.
In contrast, StegBtree- performs just as well as Btree initially because the former’s
larger fan-out and hence shorter height compensate for the I/Os on the header
block. However, higher space utilizations lead to more frequent address collisions,
and the extra I/Os in tracking down index nodes cause performance to degrade















































(a) Clustered (b) Unclustered
Figure 3.14: Sensitivity to Query Selectivity
This experiment confirms that native support for B-tree should be built into
StegFD. Among the two steganographic B-tree schemes, StegBtree- is ideal for
sparsely populated volumes, whereas StegBtree consistently achieves performance
that is just marginally slower than Btree.
Sensitivity to Query Selectivity
The second set of experiments is intended to study the behavior of StegBtree and
StegBtree- with range queries. Here we vary the query selectivity from 1000 tuples
to 10000 tuples. Figures 3.14(a) and 3.14(b) give the results for clustered and
unclustered indices, respectively.
For clustered indices, Btree is clearly the fastest, especially at high selectivity
factors where data access time dominates index access time. This is because Btree





















Figure 3.15: Sensitivity to Concurrency
whereas the other three schemes incur random I/O operations. However, for un-
clustered indices, Btree has no advantage over StegBtree and StegBtree-. Finally,
we observe that Btree on StegFD is still the worst performer.
Sensitivity to Concurrency
Having discovered that Btree can be superior to the steganographic B-tree schemes,
we are interested to find out whether this relative performance still holds in a
multi-user environment. Instead of issuing queries one after another as in the
earlier experiments, we now generate multiple range queries (for 2000 tuples each)
concurrently on a clustered index. Figure 3.15 plots the access time against the
number of concurrent queries.
As shown in the figure, increased concurrency slows down all of the schemes.
Moreover, the access time of Btree gradually approaches those of StegBtree and
StegBtree-. This is due to the larger amount of random I/O operations when
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queries are interleaved. Hence, in practice, StegBtree and StegBtree- are likely to
fare favorably relative to Btree, and even clustered B-trees.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced StegFD, a practical scheme to implement a
steganographic file system that offers plausible deniability to owners of protected
files. StegFD securely hides user-selected files in a file system so that, without the
corresponding access keys, an attacker would not be able to deduce their existence,
even if the attacker understands the hardware and software of the file system com-
pletely, and is able to scour through its data structures and the content on the raw
disks. StegFD achieves this steganographic property while ensuring the integrity
of the files, and maintaining efficient space utilization at the same time. We have
also proposed two schemes for implementing Steganographic B-trees in a StegFD
volume.
We have implemented StegFD as a file system driver in the Linux kernel 2.4.
Extensive experiments on the system confirm that StegFD is capable of achieving
an order of magnitude improvements in performance and/or space utilization over
the existing steganographic schemes. In fact, StegFD is just as fast in a multi-
user environment as the native Linux file system, which is the best that any file
protection scheme can aim for.
However, the applicability of StegFD is limited to local systems such as desktop
PCs, laptops and traditional application servers whose storage is protected locally.
In these platforms, data storage would only be temporarily exposed to adversaries.
With the advances of internet and the emergence of new technologies like perva-
sive computing, data are increasingly being migrated from local storage devices
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to shared storage on open networks. The shared storage would be contiguously
inspected by adversaries, and expose the existence of hidden data through other
avenues, such as the I/O activities. Therefore, the scheme of StegFD would be
unable to secure hidden data in those shared storages. In the rest of this thesis,
we will address the problem of designing adequate steganographic file systems for
shared storage on open platform.
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Chapter 4
A Model for Steganographic File System
StegFD, the steganographic file system introduced in last chapter, is designed for
personal computers and servers with local storage. It is not necessarily applica-
ble to platforms other than local systems, such as a distributed storage, which is
faced with additional security threats. (As what will be introduced shortly, it is
vulnerable to attacks such as update analysis and data traffic analysis.) Although
there have been a number of proposals of steganographic file system before StegFD,
no study has been conducted on their applicabilities in different application envi-
ronments. Cryptographic file systems, such as EFS and CFS, have been designed
accordingly to meet the requirements of different applications. Steganographic file
systems are also challenged by different security threats in different application
environments. They have to be constructed accordingly to provide sufficient pro-
tection for hidden data. This chapter introduces a security model to generalize
the objective and design of steganographic file system, so that we could construct
adequate file system for platforms that are exposed to different levels of risks. The
model also enables us to measure the effectiveness of a system construction under
different security threats.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model we
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proposed for steganographic file system. Section 2 analyzes the potential threats to
a steganographic file systems through the model and proposes a metric to measure
the security levels provided by different system constructions. Summary is given
in Section 3.
4.1 System Model
In a typical model for network security, activity space is divided into secure and
insecure domains. A user encrypts and decrypts data in systems located in the
secure domain, and the encrypted data is transmitted over the insecure network,
so that the data remains unaccessible to outside attackers. Analogously, our model
of steganographic file system also divides the activity space of a file system into
secure and insecure domains, as shown in figure 4.1. A user is located within
the secure domain, and the interactions between him and the file system in this
domain cannot be observed or interfered by adversaries. An attacker located in
the insecure domain is able to monitor the information and/or activities exposed
in this domain. The file system, accessible to both users and attackers, stretches
across both domains. In this model, the user attempts to hide data within the file
system so that its existence cannot be detected by the attacker, while the attacker
endeavors to collect as many evidences as possible from the insecure domain to
prove the existence of hidden data.
The division of the activity space between the secure domain and the insecure
domain is determined by the specific application environment of the steganographic
file system. The space could be divided from (i) the dimension of geographic
location (some parts of the system are potentially exposed to attackers and the
other parts can be well protected) or (ii) the dimension of time (during some period
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Figure 4.1: Model of Steganographic File System
of time the system is suspected to be exposed to attackers, and at the other time
it is well protected.)
Example 1. If a steganographic file system is constructed on a personal com-
puter to protect the owner’s privacy from accidents like theft or robbery, the activity
space of the system is actually divided from the dimension of time. That is to say,
when the PC is in the control of the owner, it is considered be located in the secure
domain. At that time, the owner can create and access his hidden files freely with-
out worrying about being inspected by attackers. Contrarily, when the PC is not
attended by the owner but stolen or snatched by attackers, it is entirely placed in
the insecure domain, where attackers could directly access the secondary storage to
look for evidence of hidden files. Thus, a steganographic file system for PC should
automatically clear up the evidences that could indicate the existence of hidden
files whenever the owner finishes using them. Actually, StegFD fits in with this
scenario, for it is designed for personal computers.
Example 2. If the steganographic file system is constructed on a shared net-
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work storage, the division of its activity space would be based on geographic loca-
tion. As the shared storage is not trusted by users to protect the confidentiality
of their data files, it would be considered being permanently placed in the inse-
cure domain. Attacker could monitor the operations on the storage at run time to
discover the evidence of hidden files. Thus a steganographic file system on shared
storage should be able to prevent the activities of the storage device from exposing
any information about hidden files. In chapter 5 and chapter 6, we will address the
design of steganographic file system on shared network storages.
4.2 Threats and Security
As stated previously, the primary function of a steganographic file system is to
hide the protected data files in the physical storage such that attacker cannot de-
termine whether the files have ever existed. To simplify the subsequent discussion,
we assume that the file system is only threatened by passive attacks, in which ad-
versaries attempt to prove the existence of hidden files through their observations
in the insecure domain. We omit the discussion on active attacks in this thesis.
Although active attacks, aiming to modify data files, are also possible, they could
be handled by conventional cryptographic methods, e.g. digital signature.
In passive attacks, attackers would collect as many as possible evidences to
prove the existence of hidden files. As mentioned previously, in different application
environments, the division of activity space between secure and insecure domains
would be defined differently. Attackers could therefore observe different evidences.
For a steganographic file system constructed on a PC, when it is snatched an
attacker, the attacker could look for evidences from the whole system. The contents
in the raw storage, either plain or encrypted, and the activity log that records
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the past operations on the hidden files could all help attackers in estimating the
existence of hidden files. In contrast, for a steganographic file system constructed
on a shared storage, all the I/O traffics on the storage could be inspected and
analyzed by attackers to detect the existence of hidden file. To design an effective
steganographic file system, we have to assume that all the information exposed to
the insecure domain is available to attackers, and construct a system such that
these information is not sufficient for proving the existence of hidden files.
From the perspective of an attacker, proving the existence of hidden files is a
decision making process. He sets up a deterministic function which takes as input
his observation in the insecure domain and produces as output a decision on whether
there is any hidden file. Usually, if the probability of a correct decision is sufficiently
high, e.g. ≥ 90%, an attacker would regard his attacks successful. Therefore,
the security of a steganographic file system could be measured by the accuracy
attackers could achieve in determining whether the system contains hidden files.
The more accurate the decision made by attackers, the less secure the file system.
For instance, it is reasonable to assume that in the sample space, 50% of the
steganographic file systems contain hidden files and the other 50% do not contain
hidden files. Then, even attackers’ decision is based on random guess, it could be
50% accurate. For a steganographic file system, if no deterministic function attack
can achieve an accuracy of more than 50%, the system would be extremely secure.
On the contrary, if a particular attack can 100% accurately identify the file systems
with hidden files, the steganographic file system is actually useless.
Theoretically, Suppose I denotes the observation obtained by attackers in the
insecure domain, and F denotes the state indicating whether the file system con-
tains hidden files, i.e. F = true if hidden file exists, F = false if no hidden
file. P is the function of probability. Attackers’ objective is to estimate PF |I . If
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PF=true|I=i > 50%, when the observation is i, he will determine there is hidden files.













Equation 4.2 indicates the accuracy of attackers’ decision is determined by how
his observation is affected by the existence/non-existence of hidden files, namely
PI|F=true and PI|F=false.
Theorem 4.2.1. Suppose F (I) is the deterministic function an attacker used to
decide the existence of hidden files through his observation. If and only if there exists
an observation i such that PI=i|F=true 6= PI=i|F=false, there must be a deterministic
function F (I) that could make more accurate decision on whether a file system
contains hidden files than random guess.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.1. Since PF=true = PF=false =
1
2
, the highest accuracy of
random guess is 50%. According to equation 4.2, attacker’s deterministic function
could be
F (i) =
 true if PI=i|F=true > PI=i|F=falsefalse if PI=i|F=true < PI=i|F=false
F (I) = 50%, if only if PI=i|F=true = PI=i|F=false = 50% for all is. Otherwise,
F (I) > 50%, and this function could always make more accurate decision than
random guess.
Theorem 4.2.1 points out that if the existence of hidden file would affect the
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Figure 4.2: System Security VS the Probability Distributions of Observations
probability distribution of attacker’s observation, attacker could be able to more
accurately estimate the existence of hidden file than random guess. As an example,
if the existence of hidden file will cause the value of a particular meta-data to
turn from 0 to 1, attackers could base his decision on whether this value is 0
or 1. Thus, this meta-data helps attackers more accurately assess the existence of
hidden files. To construct a secure steganographic file system, such evidence should
be eliminated.
According to above proof, if PI|F=true 6= PI|F=false, an attacker could actually
set up a threshold in the observation space to maximize the accuracy of his decision
on whether there is hidden file. This is illustrated in figure 4.2. When PI|F=true >
PI|F=false, he determines that hidden file exists. When PI|F=true < PI|F=false, he
determines that hidden file does not exist. The more similar between the probability
distributions PI|F=true and PI|F=false, the less effective the threshold to determine
the existence of hidden file, and the more secure the file system. Thus, to design
an effective steganographic file system, it is crucial to ensure that the observation
in the insecure domain is not affected significantly by the existence/non-existence
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of hidden files, so that PI|F=true and PI|F=false could sufficient similar. We first
propose the definition of a unconditionally secure steganographic file system.
Definition 4.2.2. If the probability distribution of the observation in the insecure
domain given that hidden files exist exactly matches the probability distribution
of the observation given that no hidden file exist, i.e. PI=i|F=true = PI=i|F=false for
all the is, we call the steganographic file system unconditionally secure.
An unconditionally secure steganographic file system would be perfect but not
absolutely necessary. Users would still regard the file system secure enough, if
the two probability distributions are so similar that the accuracy of attacker’s
determination is limited to a very small range.
However, in some circumstances an attacker could obtain unlimited observations
in the insecure domain. Namely, if he spends more time and effort, he could
obtain more observation, and would be likely to discover more evidence to prove
the existence of hidden files. For example, in a steganographic file system built on a
shared network storage, the I/O operations on the storage could potentially expose
the existence of hidden files. If an attacker spends more time to monitor the I/O
operations, he could probably find more hints about the existence of hidden file.
Thus, if a steganographic file system is not unconditionally secure, attackers could
always accumulate enough evidences to accurately determine whether it contains
hidden file.
Theoretically, we suppose that each time an attacker could obtain one observa-
tion I from the insecure domain, and he is able to obtain multiple Is if he spends
more time and energy to observe. Let SI denotes the set of observations obtained
by an attacker. According to the Weak Law of Large Numbers in information
theory [46], if |I| is finite and PI|F=true and PI|F=false do not exactly match, by
accumulating sufficiently large number of Is, PSI |F=true and PSI |F=false would be
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probability distribution of observation when hidden file does not exist






Figure 4.3: More Observations Increase the Accuracy of Attacker’s Decision
very different. This is illustrated in figure 4.3. Therefore, if PI|F=true 6= PI|F=false,
an attacker could always be able to accurately determine the existence of hidden
files if he can collect sufficiently large number of observations.
In practice, however, the computation resource of an attacker is limited. In
order to effectively detect the existence of hidden files, he may need a long time
and a large amount of computational power, which may be infeasible to obtain. In
this case, even though there is no perfect match between PI|F=true and PI|F=false,
we can also consider the system to be secure. Based on this rationale, we propose
the definition of a computationally secure steganographic file system.
Definition 4.2.3. Let T denote the maximum tolerable error for attacker to de-
termine the existence of hidden files. P (SI) denotes the computation cost to collect
and analyze the set of observation SI . Furthermore, to determine the existence of
hidden files with an error rate less than T , it requires some minimum computation
cost P (SI). Thus, P (SI) is proportional to the security level of the steganographic
file system. If P (SI) is infeasible for attackers to acquire, the system is computa-
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tionally secure.
In real world applications, a computationally secure steganographic file sys-
tem is already adequate. So, the objective of a system designer is to transform
PI|F=true and PI|F=false to be sufficiently similar such that the system could satisfy
the condition to be computationally secure. We would like to thank Claude El-
wood Shannon, the founder of the communication theory, as the above definitions
are inspired by his definitions of security in the context of cryptographic systems
[62].
4.3 A Security Analysis of StegFD
We apply the above model to StegFD. The activity space of StegFD should be
divided along the dimension of time, because it is designed for systems whose
storages are protected locally. Only when the system is occupied by an attacker, it
is exposed in the insecure domain, and the attacker could examine the secondary
storage to look for hidden files. As attackers could not monitor the file system at
run time, all he can observe in the insecure domain is a snapshot of the storage
space. Hence, his estimation of whether there is any hidden file would be based on
this snapshot.
The snapshot of the storage space shows to the attacker the blocks abandoned
during system creation, the encrypted data blocks occupied by some hidden files
and some unallocated blocks. (For simplicity, we omit dummy files in our analy-
sis.) As we assume that the encryption used by StegFD is very secure, attackers
should not be able to distinguish between an encrypted data block and an aban-
doned block filled with randomly generated data. For all encrypted data blocks
and abandoned blocks are randomly distributed across the storage space, attack-
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ers should get no information from the distribution of these blocks. Therefore, an
attacker can only base his determination of the existence of hidden files on the
storage space utilization, i.e. the total number of abandoned blocks and encrypted
data blocks.
Suppose the storage space consists of N blocks, in which a blocks are aban-
doned blocks and d blocks are occupied by hidden files. Suppose F denotes
the existence/non-existence of hidden file. According to our model, the sim-
ilarity between probability distributions Pa+d|F=true and Pa+d|F=false determines
the security level of StegFD. Here, Pa+d=k|F=false = Pa=k,d=0 and Pa+d=k|F=true =∑k
i=1 Pa=k−i,d=i, since the existence/non-existence of hidden file is equivalent to
the existence/non-existence of encrypted data blocks. In order for StegFD to be
unconditionally secure, these probability distributions should satisfy Pa+d|F=true =
Pa+d|F=false, namely Pa=k,d=0 =
∑k
i=1 Pa=k−i,d=i for each k ≤ N . That is to say,
the probability distribution of the number of abandoned blocks Pa should satisfy
the following set of equations.

Pd=0|a=1Pa=1 = Pd=1|a=0Pa=0
Pd=0|a=2Pa=2 = Pd=2|a=0Pa=0 + Pd=1|a=1Pa=1
......
Pd=0|a=NPa=N = Pd=N |a=0Pa=0 + ...+ Pd=1|a=N−1Pa=N−1∑N
i=0 Pa=i = 1
(4.3)
Actually, there is a valid Pa that satisfies the above set of equations. If the num-
ber of abandoned blocks of a StegFD follow this distribution Pa, the StegFD would
be unconditionally secure. However, in this Pa, Pa=i would increase sharply with
i, so that the expected number of abandoned blocks would be very high and the
effective space utilization would be limited to a very low level. In practice, to bal-
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ance security with space utilization, the system administrator need not introduce
so many abandoned blocks to make a StegFD unconditionally secure. When the
system is not unconditionally secure, although an attacker could make more accu-
rate estimation about whether hidden files exist than random guess, it is unlikely
that this small improvement on accuracy could enable him to perform effective
attacks. As the attacker cannot obtain any other observation than the snapshot
of the raw storage, he cannot further improve the accuracy of his judgement by
collecting more evidences. Therefore, even when a StegFD is not unconditionally
secure, it could still remains a certain security. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the
expected fraction of the abandoned blocks in StegFD is normally below 50%.
4.4 Summary
This chapter proposed a model for steganographic file system. In this model, the
activity space of a file system is divided into secure and insecure domains according
to particular applications, and the information exposed in the insecure domain is
used by attacker to discover hidden files. Then the security of a system construction
could be assessed by whether the attacker could obtain sufficient information to
accurately estimate the existence of hidden files. This model will be used frequently
in the following chapters, when we design steganographic file system on various
platforms that are faced with different levels of risks.
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Chapter 5
Hiding updates in Steganographic File
System
The system model introduced in chapter 4 provides theoretical fundaments for
developing effective steganographic file system in various applications are faced
with different types of risks. In this chapter, we attempt to extend the application
of steganographic file system from local exclusive platforms to distributed shared
platforms, which are challenged by additional threats such as update analysis. We
first introduce and study update analysis attacks, and then propose a construction
of steganographic file system that is unconditionally secure against update analysis
attacks. Finally, we presents some experiment results that confirm the effectiveness
and practicality of the construction.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces some emerging appli-
cations and systems that are faced with update analysis attacks. Section 2 gives
an overview of update analysis attacks, and defines the specific model of stegano-
graphic file system to counter update analysis. The system construction to guard
against update analysis is given in Section 3. Following that, Section 4 describes




Ubiquitous computing entails the permeation of computing in every facet of our
lives, be it work, personal or leisure, to a point where users take it for granted
and stop to notice it. The data that underlie the ubiquitous services have to
be persistent and available anywhere-anytime. This means that the data must
migrate from devices local to individual computers, to shared network storage. A
development that would facilitate this migration is the emergence of data grids
(e.g. see [1, 21]), which enable arrays of storage nodes, possibly separated over
long distances, to function together as a single integrated block-access volume.
Another supporting development is the recent interest in building reliable logical
storage volumes on unreliable nodes in a peer-to-peer platform (e.g. [44]). We are
then motivated to apply steganographic file system to such platforms to provide a
strong protection for private data – without being authored, one cannot determine
whether the data exists.
While shared network storage provides the availability needed for ubiquitous
computing, it introduces new challenges in data security. For a steganographic file
system built on shared storage, there are new avenues from which an attacker could
attempt to break it. Specifically, if an attacker can compare consecutive snapshots
of the storage space, he can detect changes on blocks that do not belong to any
plain files, and conclude that one or more hidden files exist. We call this attack
update analysis. Figure 5.1 illustrates the update analysis problem. A small update
on Sal table leads to a difference between the snapshot taken before the update and
the next snapshot after the update. This difference suggests that the DBMS has
updated some hidden data, and can be used by an attacker as evidence to disclose
the table being updated.
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Figure 5.1: Hidden Data is Exposed by Update
file systems are primarily designed to ensure that an attacker cannot easily deduce
the existence of hidden files by examining a single snapshot of local storage devices.
They do not address the additional risk faced by shared storage. In this chapter,
we propose another system construction to protect against update analysis attacks.
The mechanisms are constructed to balance between three different objectives: (a)
security: an attacker cannot deduce whether the blocks involved in any observable
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Figure 5.2: Effect of Dummy Accesses
dummy updates should not compromise the integrity of the hidden files, resulting
in irrecoverable data loss; and (c) performance: any performance degradation from
the overheads introduced should be minimized.
5.2 System Model against Update Analysis
In this section, we outline the specific model for the steganographic file system that
we designed to counter those attacks.
5.2.1 Dummy Update
To prevent updates (as illustrated in figure 5.1) from exposing the existence of
hidden data, a counter measure is to issue a stream of purposeless updates on the
storage. If these dummy updates could be made to appear indistinguishable from
the genuine data accesses, attacker would not be able to deduce the existence of
hidden data from any observed updates. As figure 5.2 shows, since the system has
been conducting dummy updates on the storage periodically, the attacker cannot
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Raw StorageAgentUsers
Figure 5.3: Model of Steganographic File System to counter update analysis
tell whether a changed block is due to a real or dummy update. Hiding real data
updates among dummy updates is the basic idea for constructing a steganographic
file system to defend against update analysis attacks.
5.2.2 System Model
In this subsection, we describe a model of the steganographic file system that is able
to hide data updates. We also give a security notion to measure the effectiveness
of hiding data accesses based on the model of chapter 4.
System. Figure 5.3 shows the model. The users on the left hand of figure 5.3
have their data files stored in the raw storage. Between the users and the storage
is an agent that is fully trusted by the users and is authorized to access the storage
directly. Whenever users need to access their data files in the raw storage, they have
to route the requests through the agent. Upon receiving the requests, the agent
translates them to corresponding I/O operations, and afterward returns the results
to the users. When there is no active workload, the agent would issue dummy
updates on the raw storage. Therefore, any attacker who might be monitoring the
raw storage would not be able to isolate users’ update operations from dummy
updates, and thus cannot deduce the existence of hidden files.
Commonly, as the users and the agent can communicate through some trusted
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channels deliberately, they are always located in the secure domain. But the raw
storage is the shared resource in the network, which is always in the insecure do-
main. Common practical scenarios for such a model include shared storage area
networks (SAN), data grids [1, 21] and peer-to-peer storage platforms [44].
Attacker. Attackers of such a steganographic file system are able to scan the
whole raw storage repeatedly, so they can identify any updates conducted on the
raw storage. Or they are able to examine the activity log to discover the updates
conducted in the past. We assume that attackers have a complete understanding
of the scheme running in the system. However, they do not know any secret access
keys held by users or the agent. Neither can they observe the real-time operations
within the agent and the interactions between the agent and users in the secure do-
main. We assume that the users can communicate with the agent through a secure
channel and the agent is a computer that is properly shielded from external probes.
Memory. The raw storage is the only permanent mass storage in the system.
However, we allow the clients and the agent to have some local cache. A user
should keep track of the access key(s) to his hidden files, through which the agent
can authenticate the user’s identity and locate the corresponding hidden files. The
access keys may be committed to the user’s memory, or stored within a tamper-
proof device like a smartcard. The agent needs some working memory to carry out
its processing. Its working memory is volatile and thus leaves behind no information
to attackers. We distinguish between an agent that has a non-volatile memory for
storing some secret information about the file system, and one that does not:
• Non-volatile Agent This category of agent runs in a very safe environment
that is immune to any attacks. It possesses a non-volatile memory for keeping
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Figure 5.4: Effectiveness of Hiding Updates
some secrets on the file system. The shortcoming is that the system admin-
istrator could be at risk of being coerced by attacker to disclose the hidden
data.
• Volatile Agent This category of agent does not retain user information in
persistent memory, and is less likely to compromise the system even if the
protection around the agent is breached. The trade-off is that there is a
higher maintenance cost.
While the user machines and the agent are allowed to have some local cache, they
are not of the same order of magnitude as the raw storage. Thus, user data still
have to be stored on the raw storage.
Definition of Security. To conceal the existence of files, the agent can encrypt
the files, introduce random data, and scatter them across the storage space just like
the StegFD in chapter 3. At the same time, the agent should hide user updates
by mixing in dummy updates. According to chapter 4, the pattern of real data
updates should appear the same as the pattern of dummy updates. Otherwise, an
attacker may be able to isolate the real data updates and prove the existence of
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hidden files. This is illustrated in figure 5.4, where the update pattern is expressed
as the probability distribution of the update sequence. Here we give the definition
of security for hiding data updates in a steganographic file system, as an extension
of definition 4.2.2 and definition 4.2.3 in chapter 4.
Definition 5.2.1. Let X denote the sequence of updates the agent performs on
the raw storage. Its probability distribution is PX . Y denotes the set of update
requests users submit to the agent, and when there is no request, Y = Ø. PX|Y
is the conditional probability distribution of X given a particular Y . (Thus, PX|Ø
is the probability distribution of dummy updates.) A system is unconditionally
secure if and only if, whatever Y is, PX|Y = PX|Ø. A system is computationally
secure iff PX|Y and PX|Ø are so similar that it is computationally infeasible for an
attacker to distinguish between them from a sufficiently large sequence of updates.
5.3 A Construction to Counter Update Analysis
This section presents the mechanism to equip steganographic file system to counter
update analysis, where attackers might take multiple snapshots of the raw storage
and detect updates on hidden files. We make a strong assumption that attackers
can observe all the updates in the raw storage, although not all the attackers are so
powerful in reality. The task of the agent is to hide the data updates from attackers
by introducing dummy updates.
For simplicity, the agent’s dummy updates are generated from a random process.
However, as users’ update operations could exhibit some regular patterns, e.g. table
scans, an attacker might be able to isolate the data updates through some statistical
methods. The proposed mechanism counters this threat, by changing the location of









Figure 5.5: File System Construction
We begin with a construction that works with a non-volatile agent, and subse-
quently extend the mechanism to work with a volatile agent.
5.3.1 Construction 1: Non-Volatile Agent
A non-volatile agent is able to retain some critical user information, so that it has
a complete view of the file system at any time and can freely reorganize it. This
simplifies the task of hiding updates and system maintenance.
Data blocks
Figure 5.5 shows the basic construction of this scheme. As in conventional file
systems, it partitions the raw storage into standard-size blocks, and classifies them
into data blocks that contain useful data and dummy blocks that contain only
random bytes. Both groups of blocks are scattered randomly across the storage
volume.
As figure 5.5 shows, each block contains an initial vector (IV) and a data field.
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The data field contains real data in the case of a data block, and random bytes
if it is a dummy block. For each block in the raw storage, whether a data block
or a dummy block, its data field is encrypted by the agent using a CBC (Cipher
Block Chaining) block cipher with the IV as seed. Whenever the agent re-encrypts
a block, it resets the IV so that the content of the whole encrypted block changes.
This enables the agent to carry out dummy updates on any block, by simply chang-
ing its IV. An attacker without the encryption key cannot tell whether the data
field is actually modified.
Hidden files
A hidden file is a set of data blocks that are organized in a tree structure, with
the file header as the root note. This structure of hidden file is similar to that of
StegFD in chapter 3. The location of the header of a hidden file is derivable from
its access key FAK and path name. Once these are provided by the owner, the
agent can recover the file content from the raw storage. An attacker without the
FAK would not be able to deduce the existence of the hidden file even if he scours
through the raw storage.
All the dummy blocks in the raw storage belong to a single dummy file, a hidden
file whose FAK is held by the agent. Hence the agent keeps two keys in its non-
volatile memory. One is the FAK of the dummy file, the other is the secret key
for encrypting all the storage blocks.
Dummy updates
Whenever there is no user activity, the agent would issue dummy updates on ran-
domly selected blocks in the storage volume. In each dummy update, the agent
reads in the selected block, decrypts it, assigns a new random number to its IV,
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re-encrypts it, and then writes it back. The dummy updates are completely ran-
dom, i.e., every data block has the same probability of being selected. The dummy
updates do not compromise data integrity since only the IVs are changed.
As the data blocks are encrypted, without the agent’s encryption key, an at-
tacker cannot differentiate a dummy update that only changes the IV from an
update that modifies the data content. As the dummy updates are inserted in
between data updates, their frequencies are similar so the attacker cannot isolate
the data updates through any variance in update frequency.
Data updates
The introduction of dummy updates alone is not enough to hide the existence of
data updates. The pattern of data updates must also be made similar to that
of a random process. We achieve that by relocating a data block each time it is
updated, so that the access pattern for a logical data block cannot be established
by attackers.
When there is a request to update a data block, the agent first randomly selects
a block within the storage volume. If the selected block is exactly the same block
that is being updated, the agent simply performs the required update on it. If
the selected block is a dummy block, the agent swaps it with the data block and
updates its content in the process. Otherwise, if another data block is selected, the
agent does a dummy update on it, and starts over again to look for another block.
The update algorithm, given in figure 5.6, combines the procedures for dummy
update and data update.
Proof of Security
Now, we prove that this scheme is unconditionally secure against update analysis.
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func update ()
if there is a request to update block B1, then
Re: randomly pick up a block B2 from the storage space;
if B2 = B1, then
read in B1, decrypt it,
update B1’s IV and data field,
encrypt B1, write it back;
else if B2 is a dummy block, then
read in B1,
substitute B2 for B1,
update B2’s IV and data field,
encrypt B2, write it back;
else
read in B2, decrypt it,
update B2’s IV ,
encrypt B2, write it back;
goto Re;
else // dummy update
randomly pick up a block B3 from the storage space;
read in B3, decrypt it,
update B3’s IV ,
encrypt B3, write it back;
func end
Figure 5.6: Update Algorithm
Proof. When there is no data update, all the updates on the raw storage are dummy
updates, which follow random distribution, i.e. PX|Ø = Pran. When there is data
update, as each updated block is still randomly selected from the whole storage
space (based on the above algorithm), all the updates on the raw storage also follow
random distribution, i.e. PX|Y = Pran. Therefore, whether there is any data update
or not, the updates on the raw storage follow the same probability distribution as
that of dummy updates, i.e. PX|Ø = PX|Y . According to the definition 5.2.1, the
scheme is unconditionally secure.
Being unconditionally secure means that the system is very vigorous against
update analysis – without knowing the agent’s encryption key, attackers can get no
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information of the hidden data no matter how much effort they spend on analyzing
the updates on the raw storage.
Processing Overhead
An update in a conventional file system would incur two I/O operations – read
in the block, update it and write it back. With our scheme, the agent needs to
repeat a block selection procedure until it successfully completes the update. Each
iteration in this procedure incurs two I/Os – to read in a block and write out the
block. Therefore, the processing overhead is decided by the number of iterations.
Suppose the raw storage has N blocks, out of which D are dummy blocks. The
probability that a randomly selected block is a dummy block is p = D
N
, and the
probability that i iterations are needed is (1− p)i−1p. Thus the expected overhead,
defined as the total number of I/Os in our scheme divided by the number of I/Os in
a conventional file system, depends on the fraction of dummy blocks in the storage
volume:
E = p+ 2× (1− p)p+ 3× (1− p)2p+ ... = N
D
If at least half of the storage space is occupied by dummy blocks, i.e., the space
utilization is kept below 50%, the expected overhead is 2 at the very most. As
storage space is cheap today, it makes sense to sacrifice some space to achieve
better processing throughput.
Another overhead of our scheme is the block relocation upon each update. As
each data block is traced through its file header, we need to update the header
whenever a block is relocated. However, since the file header is always placed in
the cache and is written out only when the file is saved, this overhead will not
add significantly to the response time. For database objects, such as B-tree, the
relocation of a block would require a propagation of updates on a number of other
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blocks and thus incur a higher overhead. While the performance optimization on
steganographic DBMS is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is scheduled in our
future works (see Section 7.2.3).
5.3.2 Construction 2: Volatile Agent
While the above construction for non-volatile agent protects against update analysis
on the raw storage, the encryption key for all the data and the FAK for the dummy
file are kept centrally in the persistent memory of the agent. This could subject
the administrator of the agent to coercion from attackers. In this subsection, we
extend the construction to work with a volatile agent that does not use a persistent
memory to store any secret about the file system, so that attackers cannot elicit any
useful information from the administrator. In this second scheme, the encryption
key of the hidden files are retained by the owners, and each user possesses his own
dummy file(s). The encryption key and the FAK of the dummy file(s) are disclosed
to the agent only when the user logs on.
Distributing secrets to users
Instead of using the agent’s key to encrypt all the blocks, this construction assigns
each hidden file encrypting keys. Actually, the FAK of each hidden file comprises
3 components – the location of the file header, a header key for encrypting the
header information, and a content key for encrypting the file content. Moreover,
dummy blocks in the raw storage are organized into dummy files of approximately
the size of data files, and distributed to the users. Within the FAK of a dummy
file, only the location of the header and the header key are used; the content key
is not utilized because the file contains only random bytes.
With this scheme, a user who is being compelled to disclose his hidden files can
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just expose some dummy files and remain silent on his hidden data. He can even
reveal the header key for a hidden file but give a wrong content key, and claim that
the file is a dummy.
Operations of the volatile agent
The volatile agent performs updates on the raw storage in the same way as the
non-volatile agent, except that here the agent can only update files that users have
disclosed to it.
When the agent starts up, it has zero knowledge of the hidden and dummy files
in the raw storage. As each user logs on to the system, he shares the FAKs to
his hidden files and dummy files with the agent. As more users log in, the agent
would discover more hidden files and dummy blocks to carry out dummy updates
on. Thus, while an attacker may find part of the raw storage being accessed at
any one time, this does not disclose any meaningful information since the updated
blocks do not necessarily contain useful data.
Key management
Most security systems provide key management mechanisms to carry out the op-
erations like key generation, verification and backup. But our steganographic file
system lets each individual user to manage their own keys. Whenever the FAK of
a hidden file is generated, the user keeps it in his local memory and uses his local
key management facility to maintain his FAKs. Sometimes, he can also refer to






Figure 5.7: System Architecture
5.4 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented a steganographic file system based on the volatile agent
scheme introduced in Section 5.3.2 and conducted experiments to evaluate their
performance. This section begins by describing the implementation, then presents
results from some interesting experiments.
5.4.1 System Implementation
We implemented the proposed steganographic file system in Linux. Figure 5.7
shows the architecture of the implementation. It consists of three components:
the client, the agent and the storage. The client component provides an interface
through which users can access their hidden files in a similar way as in a conven-
tional file system. The agent component acts as a server that processes all the
client requests and manages the storage. The storage component provides storage
resources and may be located either on the same machine as the agent, on a differ-
ent machine, or on a networked storage system like OceanStore [44]. We use AES
[4] for the block cipher, and the pseudo-random number generator is constructed
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Parameter Value
Model of the CPU Intel Pentium 4
Clock speed of the CPU 1.6 GHz
Type of the hard disk Ultra ATA/100
Capacity of the hard disk 20 GB
Table 5.1: Physical Resource Parameters
from SHA256 [6].
5.4.2 Experimental Evaluation
We first conduct experiments to evaluate the I/O performance of the schemes that
can counter update analysis (see Section 5.3). The platform we used for the ex-
periments is an Intel PC, whose key parameters are listed in Table 6.3. And Table
6.7 summarizes the workload parameters. For comparison, we use as baselines the
native Linux file system and the StegFD introduced in chapter 3. The notations
for the various file systems are shown in Table 5.3.
Parameter Default
Size of each disk block 4 KBytes
Size of each file (4, 8] MBytes
Capacity of the disk volume 1 GBytes
Space Utilization (0, 50%]
Table 5.2: Workload Parameters
StegHide indicates the volatile agent scheme which we have implemented as
a real file system. We installed the file system on the Intel PC, with the agent
and the storage components running together on the PC. StegHide* indicates the
non-volatile agent scheme we have simulated. The simulation is conducted on a
1GB disk volume. We use a bitmap to mark data blocks against dummy blocks,
and conduct updates on randomly selected data blocks, using the algorithm in
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Parameter Meaning
StegHide Construction 2: volatile
agent
StegHide∗ Construction 1: non-
volatile agent
StegFD The file system in chapter 3
CleanDisk A fresh Linux file system
FragDisk A well-used Linux file sys-
tem with fragmentation
Table 5.3: Algorithm Indicators
Figure 5.6. StegFD is our former steganographic file system introduced in chapter
3. CleanDisk and FragDisk are native file systems in Linux - CleanDisk is a fresh
file system, whose files reside on contiguous data blocks. FragDisk is a well used
file system whose storage are fragmented, and we simulate it by breaking each file
into fragments of 8 blocks.
Performance on data retrieval
The first group of experiments aims to study the performance of retrieving files from
the steganographic file system. We vary the file size and the number of concurrent
users, and study how they affect the access time of retrieving a file from various file
systems. Figure 5.8 (a) shows the access times of retrieving files of different sizes in
a single user environment. Figure 5.8 (b) shows the sensitivity of the access time
to the number of concurrent users.
StegHide, StegHide* and StegFD display similar performance in data retrieval,
since their data blocks are distributed across the storage in the same manner. In
a single user environment, FragDisk and CleanDisk outperform the three stegano-
graphic file systems, as they can perform sequential I/O on their contiguously















































(b) Sensitivity to Concurrency
Figure 5.8: Performance on Data Retrieval
increases. As shown in figure 5.8 (b), when the number of users increases to 16
onward, random I/Os dominate the whole process, the access times of the five
systems become very close.
Performance on updates
Having demonstrated our file system’s performance on data retrieval, we proceed
to profile its update performance.
As our system intends to counter update analysis, it introduces extra overhead
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to update operations. This overhead is affected by the space utilization, which
is explained in Section 4.1.5. Thus we first study the sensitivity of the update
performance to space utilization. We vary the space utilization from 10% to 50%,
and plot the access time of updating a randomly selected data block of a file. The
results are shown in figure 5.9 (a).
The update overheads of StegHide and StegHide* increase with increasing space
utilization. This matches our analysis in Section 4.1.5, where we state that E(overhead)
= N
D
. As the storage space is cheap today, it is feasible to use extra storage space
to exchange for a better update performance. Actually, in our implementation, we
limit the space utilization to below 50%.
Sometimes an update is performed on a large range of data which may occupy
more than one consecutive data blocks. In the second set of experiments, we study
the sensitivity of update performance to the number of consecutive blocks being
updated. We fix the space utilization of StegHide and StegHide* to 25%, and vary
the update range from 1 to 5 data blocks. The results are shown in figure 5.9
(b). The access times of FragDisk and CleanDisk do not vary significantly with the
increasing update range because of the benefits of sequential I/O, while those of
the three steganographic file systems increase linearly with the number of updated
blocks.
The third set of experiments aims to study the performance of updates in a
multi-user environment. We fix the update range to 5 data blocks, and plot the
access times of various file systems for different degree of concurreny. Figure 5.9
(c) shows the results. Like the experimental results on data retrieval, FragDisk
and CleanDisk lose their advantage in utilizing sequential I/O when the degree of
concurrency is high.







































































(c) Sensitivity to Concurrency
Figure 5.9: Performance on Update
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counter update analysis without incurring heavy overhead over general file systems.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a steganographic file system with the ability to counter
attacks initiated through analyzing data updates from user applications. It works
by introducing dummy updates into the storage to conceal the existence of real
data updates. To prevent attackers from distinguishing between real data updates
and dummy updates, the system relocates data blocks systematically to completely
remove the pattern in data updates. Two constructions are built for this file system,
one for a non-volatile agent which is trusted by users to keep their access keys,
and the other for a volatile agent which is not so trustworthy. We implemented
the constructions in Linux, and conducted experiments to show their reasonable
performance and potential for real world applications.
Compared with StegFD, which assumes that attackers could assess the exis-
tence of hidden files from only a snapshot of the storage, the system proposed
in this chapter relaxes the assumption to that attackers could repeatedly observe
the storage to identifies data updates on hidden files. In some scenarios, however,
attackers can not only observe data updates but also monitor I/O traffics on the
shared storage. An example is a storage service provider, which hosts the storage
but is not trusted by users to keep data privacy. To construct a steganographic
file system on such storage, designer needs to adopt another mechanism to prevent
attackers from detecting hidden files by analyzing I/O traffics. Chapter 6 aims to
solve this problem .
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Chapter 6
Hiding Data Traffic in Steganographic
File System
Last chapter made an initial attempt to extend the application of steganographic
file system to shared storage on open networks. The proposed system construction
successfully mitigates the risk from update analysis by hiding real data updates
into dummy updates. However, in some shared network storages, it is possible for
attackers to obtain the full control of the storage device at run-time. Thus, the
data traffics between the host file system and the storage becomes a new avenue
for attackers to detect the existence of hidden file. In this chapter, we design new
steganographic file systems to counter such attacks that attempt to disclose hidden
file through analyzing artifacts in data traffics.
6.1 Introduction
With recent technology trends like peer-to-peer storage, data grid [21, 1] and per-
vasive computing, data are increasingly being migrated from local storage devices
to shared storage on open networks. This raises the issue of protecting confidential
data in untrusted storage [45], where adversaries may be observing the content and
activities. For example, in a storage area network (SAN), storage devices are not
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attached to any particular server, but distributed over a high-speed network or even
the internet. Beyond the protection of the server, the remote storage devices could
be controlled and monitored by attackers without raising suspicion from system
administrators. Storage service provider emerges as a new internet service, which
could provide users massive and stable storage space that is available at anywhere
and anytime. However, storage service providers would not necessarily be trusted
to protect users’ confidential data. On the contrary, they could abuse the data for
their own benefits.
Building steganographic file system on platforms like SAN and storage service
providers is therefore confronted with additional threats. In particular, attackers,
who are monitoring the storage device, could statistically analyze the data updates
and I/O traffics on the storage for the existence of hidden data. The steganographic
file system introduced in last chapter is able to guard against update analysis
attacks, but is vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks, which take account of not only
data updates but all the I/O activities. I/O activities are much more difficult to
hide, because the block relocation which has been used to remove the patterns
in data updates becomes traceable to attackers and is ineffective in removing I/O
access patterns.
In this chapter, we propose two constructions of steganographic file system to
counter traffic analysis attacks. Both work by hiding real I/O traffic into random
dummy I/O traffics. Oblivious Storage, inspired by the Oblivious Ram in [30], is an
unconditionally secure file system that could completely conceal users’ access pat-
terns in I/O traffics. But it incurs excessive I/O overhead that could be intolerable
for some real-world applications. DataCavern, in contrast, is a computationally
secure file system that aims to minimize the accuracy of traffic analysis. Instead
of attempting to conceal the data traffic completely, DataCavern aims to mini-
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mize the accuracy of traffic analysis. It (a) intermixes data and dummy traffics to
reduce their correlations; (b) relocates disk pages periodically to alter the user ac-
cess patterns, and (c) buffers frequently accessed pages to remove any non-uniform
distribution in the data accesses. We have conducted extensive studies on the im-
plementation/simulation of the proposed file systems to evaluate their effectiveness
and performance. The results confirm that both schemes are effective in counter
traffic analysis, and that DataCavern can achieve more practical performance than
Oblivious Storage.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the
specific system model for countering traffic analysis and gives an overview of traffic
analysis attacks. Section 3 and Section 4 introduce the constructions of Obliv-
ious Storage and DataCavern respectively. Section 5 evaluates the security and
performance of the two constructions. Finally, Section 5 summarizes this chapter.
6.2 Problem Definition
In this section, we describe the specific model of a steganographic file system on an
untrusted storage, as well as its major challenge – defending against traffic analysis.
6.2.1 System Model
As discussed above, the specific threat that our system is designed to defend against,
over and above previous steganographic file systems, is traffic analysis by an exter-
nal observer. By analyzing data traffic on the storage, the observer can potentially
compromise one or more of the following: (a) data privacy, by reconstructing the
logical content; (b) data integrity, by tampering with the hidden data; and (c) user





StorageAgent & Its Memory
insecure domain
Figure 6.1: System Model
Corresponding to this threat model, the steganographic file system consists of
two components as shown in figure 6.1 – an agent located within the secure domain
that is typically protected by firewall(s), and a raw storage situated in the insecure
domain where the external observers are. The agent is fully authorized by users
to manage their data files. It utilizes a limited-sized memory to hold some critical
information and to process data. Data files are hidden in the raw storage using the
strategy introduced in chapter 3 and chapter 5; only the agent, with the user access
keys, knows where to recover the hidden files from. Common practical scenarios
for such a model include shared storage area networks (SAN), data grids [1, 21],
peer-to-peer storage platforms [44], and storage services hosted by external data
centers.
The key challenge in this system model is that data traffic on the raw storage
could yield evidence of hidden files. As a counter-measure, the agent can mix
dummy requests into the data accesses, and keep the storage active with dummy
I/Os when there is no user activity, so that the visible traffic between the agent
and the storage does not necessarily indicate the existence of hidden data. As
data/dummy traffic result from the agent’s data/dummy accesses on the storage,
in the rest of this chapter, we shall refer to both simply as data/dummy accesses.
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6.2.2 Traffic Analysis
In the above system model, as the whole storage and its I/O channel are exposed
to insecure domain, the accesses conducted by the agent on the storage can be an-
alyzed statistically to determine whether they include any genuine data accesses,
which would then point to the existence of hidden data. This is always possible if
the data accesses and dummy accesses exhibit different patterns. To illustrate, sup-
pose that the dummy accesses in our system follow an absolutely random process,
i.e., in generating a dummy access, the agent randomly picks a data block from the
storage space and performs a dummy read or write operation. In contrast, users’
data accesses are almost always clustered, e.g. on files, indexes or tables, and ex-
hibit patterns like sequential scan, binary search, etc. Exploiting these differences,
an attacker can employ statistical tests to accurately assess whether the observed
activity includes any data traffic.
In a statistical test, a deterministic algorithm takes as input an access sequence
observed at the shared storage, and produces as output a binary decision on whether
the sequence contains any data accesses. A typical test would make a hypothesis
that there is no data access, and uses a test statistic k to assess whether the
hypothesis is correct. As shown in figure 6.2, knowing the probability distribution
of k under the hypothesis, a threshold can be set to make the decision whether to
accept or reject the hypothesis. The accuracy of the statistical test is determined
by the probability of type I error α and that of type II error β, and an attacker
would want to cap both so that α < p and β < q for some pre-set p and q.
Based on the Neyman-Pearson theorem [25], the attacker could first limit α
to an acceptable level, then select the statistical test that yields the minimum β.
However, without knowing the actual probability distribution of k, the attacker is
not able to compute the β accurately. Thus, instead of the test with minimum
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Figure 6.2: Testing for Data Accesses
β, the attacker would have to depend on some regular tests that seem effective in
differentiating dummy accesses from data accesses. Many existing statistical tests
for random number generators [36] could be used here, including frequency test,
gap test, run test, auto-correlation test, serial test, or some universal tests [43]. In
this chapter, we use the gap test to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
file system – DataCavern, though it works for the other tests too.
6.2.3 Overview of Solution Approach
A counter-measure against traffic analysis is to minimize the accuracy of the statis-
tical tests described above. This can be achieved by transforming the data access
pattern to be so close to that of a random process that there would be a high type
I or II error associated with any test statistic.
As we have stated in chapter 4, according to the Weak Law of Large Numbers in
information theory, if the data access pattern cannot be transformed to a random
process perfectly, there is always an accurate statistical test for the existence of data
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access, given a sufficiently long access sequence. Thus theoretically a successful
defense would necessitate a perfect match between the data and dummy access
patterns. In practice, however, if the resources needed to crack a system are beyond
what attackers can be expected to muster (e.g. too long an observation period, or
too much computation power), then the system is computationally secure and offers
adequate protection.
We extend definition 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 in chapter 4, and propose the following de-
finitions to characterize the security level of a steganographic file system to counter
traffic analysis:
Prerequisite: The agent accesses the storage continuously. Whenever there is no
user activity, the agent issues dummy requests. When a user operates on a hidden
file, the agent transforms the required data accesses into stego accesses, that fulfill
the intention of the data accesses but exhibit similar pattern as the dummy traffic.
Definition 6.2.1. If the probability distribution of the stego accesses and that of
the dummy traffic match exactly, the file system is unconditionally secure.
Definition 6.2.2. Suppose the set of statistical tests that could be employed by
attackers to break the system is A. Let Tα and Tβ denote the maximum tolerable
type I error α and type II error β of any given test in A. Furthermore, to dis-
tinguish between stego accesses and dummy accesses with α < Tα and β < Tβ,
the best statistical test in A requires some minimum computation cost P . Thus,
P is proportional to the security level of the steganographic file system. If P is
infeasible for attackers to acquire, the file system is computationally secure.
Following the above reasoning, we propose two approaches to securing stegano-
graphic file system against traffic analysis. Oblivious storage is an unconditionally
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secure approach, which works by completely removing the patterns in data accesses.
DataCavern is a is computationally secure approach, which works by minimizing
the accuracy of all possible statistical tests, so that P becomes so large that the
system is computationally secure.
6.3 Oblivious Storage: An Unconditionally Se-
cure Approach
A naive solution for an unconditionally secure steganographic file system is to scan
through the entire storage for each dummy and data access. But this is way too
expensive to real applications. In [30], Oded Goldreich et al. have proved that
to completely remove the access patterns on a Random Access Memory one need
only incur an order of overhead of O((log t)3), where t is the size of the memory.
Oblivious RAM is their proposed memory architecture to achieve that performance.
Inspired by oblivious RAM, we propose the scheme of oblivious storage to conceal
users’ access pattern in the data traffics of steganographic file system.
We carve out a partition on the raw storage and construct it to be an oblivious
storage, which serves as a cache of the file system. The remaining space on the
storage is used for the StegFS (steganographic file system) partition.
6.3.1 StegFS Partition
Data is permanently stored in the StegFS partition, which is organized in the same
way as that of chapter 5. As shown in figure 6.3, the storage space is partitioned
into standard-size blocks, which could be either data blocks that contain useful
data or dummy blocks that contain only random bytes. Both groups of blocks









Figure 6.3: Structure of StegFS Partition
Without knowing the access keys, an attacker cannot deduce the existence of hidden
files even if he scours through the storage space. Dummy updates are periodically
issued to randomly selected blocks to conceal the existence of genuine data updates
on hidden files. Genuine data update is conducted in the same way as that in
chapter 5, i.e., a data block is relocated to a randomly selected position each time
it is updated. Therefore the StegFS partition is able to defend against update
analysis attacks.
6.3.2 Oblivious Storage
To counter traffic analysis, all the read accesses on the file system are diverted to
the oblivious storage. The oblivious storage serve as a huge cache of the StegFS
partition. Whenever a data block is first read from the StegFS partition, it is cached
in the Oblivious storage so that the following accesses to the block need only be
conducted on the Oblivious Storage alone, except data updates. Oblivious Storage
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Figure 6.4: Structure of Oblivious Storage
among dummy accesses. But it does not serve as a persistent storage because its
data blocks are shuﬄed frequently.
Figure 6.4 shows the oblivious storage, which is made up of a hierarchy of
memories. The first level is twice as large as the agent’s buffer cache, and each
subsequent level doubles in size until the last level is enough to accommodate all
the data blocks that could be read by users. The last level contains all the data
blocks that can be found in the oblivious storage, and the other levels may also
contain some copies of these blocks. To hide access patterns, the oblivious storage
periodically shuﬄes each level, so that users’ access patterns can be distorted and
concealed.
6.3.3 Data Processing
Here, we introduce the agent’s operations on the StegFS partition and the oblivious
storage to hide users’ data access patterns. As the StegFS partition is able to hide
data updates, we only discuss read accesses here. Whenever there is no user activity,
the agent would issue dummy read accesses on randomly selected blocks. When
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/ * steg-store - StegFS partition whose size is M
obli-store - oblivious storage whose size is N
S - the set of data blocks already in obli-store * /
func read stegfs ()
if a block B1 is required but not in obli-store, then
Re: generate a random number X that 0 ≤ X < M ;
if X< sizeof(S), then
randomly pick up a block B2 from S;
read B2 from steg-store;
goto Re;
else
copy B1 from steg-store to obli-store;
else // dummy read
randomly pick up a block B3 from steg-store;
read B3 from steg-store;
func end
Figure 6.5: Algorithm: Read on StegFS Partition
there is user request, the agent would read the requested data blocks.
Figure 6.5 gives the algorithm of the read operations on the StegFS partition.
When the system starts up, the oblivious storage is empty. Only when the data
blocks are accessed, they are copied from the StegFS partition to the oblivious stor-
age and cached in the oblivious storage subsequently. As data blocks are scattered
randomly across the storage space and each data block needs to be read only once,
the read operation on data blocks in figure 6.5 would look random and does not
expose any information to attackers.
The oblivious storage can hide any access pattern on its data blocks by distorting
the data accesses into a random process. Therefore, dummy reads and data reads
on the oblivious storage can be mixed seamlessly and simply: To satisfy a dummy
read, a randomly selected block is retrieved; whereas in the case of a data read,
the required block is retrieved. As the oblivious storage exposes no access pattern,
attackers cannot distinguish between dummy reads and data reads, and cannot
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deduce the happening of data read from the observed read operations.
The algorithm for a read operation of the oblivious storage is shown in figure
6.6. To read a data block, the agent first looks in its buffer. If the block is not
there, the agent retrieves it from the highest level in the oblivious storage where
it can be found. At the same time, it issues a read on a randomly selected block
from each of the other levels. After a data block is read, it is added to the agent’s
buffer until it becomes full, at which time all its blocks are flushed into the first
level of the oblivious storage, then all the blocks in that level are re-encrypted and
re-ordered (shuﬄed) to an arbitrary permutation. Similarly, when Leveli of the
oblivious storage is full, all its data blocks are flushed into Leveli+1, and the blocks
in Leveli+1 are then re-encrypted and re-ordered. Consequently, within each level
of the oblivious storage, any given data block will be read at most once before the
blocks in that level is re-ordered to a random permutation, so that the repeated
accesses to any logical block are untraceable. To an attacker, it appears that every
time the agent would read a randomly selected block from each level of the oblivious
storage, so the probability distribution of dummy accesses and data accesses exactly
match in oblivious storage. (Detailed proofs of security could follow those in [30].)
According to definition 6.2.1, oblivious storage is unconditionally secure to counter
traffic analysis attacks.
For re-ordering a particular level, we should be able to re-order it to a random
permutation in a concealed way. (Arguments for this can be found in [30].) Here,
we apply the external merge sort algorithm. A hash index is built for each level for
locating its data blocks. Write/update operations on data blocks within the obliv-
ious storage can be hidden in the same way as reads. A dummy write/update on a
randomly selected block could be conducted by resetting its IV and re-encrypting
the block. When a data block is updated on a higher level, it would be automatically
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/ * steg-store - StegFS partition whose size is M
obli-store - oblivious storage whose size is N
S - the set of data blocks already in obli-store * /
func dump (i)




if leveli+1 is full, then call dump (i+1);




func read oblivious (block B1)
if B1 is in the buffer, then
read B1 from the buffer;
return;
for i = from 1 to k, do
if B1 is in leveli, then
read B1 from leveli;
break ;
else
read a random block from leveli;
end loop;
for j = from i to k, do
read a random block from levelj ;
end loop;
add B1 to buffer;
if buffer is full, then
if level1 is full, then call dump (1);




Figure 6.6: Algorithm: Read on Oblivious Storage
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written to the lower levels during flush. Thus, data integrity could be ensured. The
updates/writes would also need to be repeated on the StegFS partition to ensure
consistency.
6.3.4 Processing overhead
Let B denote the size of the buffer, and N the size of the lowest level of the oblivious
storage. Thus N = 2k×B, where k is the number of levels. Whenever a data block
is to be read, the agent would locate and retrieve a block from every level. This
incurs a retrieving overhead that is proportional to 2k. Moreover, the oblivious
storage is re-ordered periodically, and this incurs a sorting overhead. The ith level
of size 2i × B is sorted at a frequency of once per 2i−1 × B reads. If we employ
external merge sort, the sorting cost for Leveli is 2
i+1B × dlogB2i + 1e, and the
average sorting cost for each read would be less than 4k×dlogB2k+1e. Therefore,
the overall cost for each read in the oblivious storage is 2k+4k×dlogB2k+1e where
k = logN
B
. For a normal file system whose N is 20GB and B is 80MB, the average
cost is about 14 + 28× 2 = 70 times that of a read operation in a conventional file
system. In real-world systems, the sorting overhead is smaller than the retrieving
overheads although it incurs more I/Os, as its I/Os are mostly sequential I/Os.
This will be further discussed in the performance evaluation subsequently.
To lower the performance penalty, it is possible to relax the security requirement
and reduce the storage’s height or the frequency that the blocks are re-sorted.
6.3.5 Experiments on Oblivious Storage
We simulated the oblivious storage and conducted performance study to estimate
its potential for real world applications. The hardware parameters of our simulation
are listed in table 6.1. We construct an oblivious storage on a 2GBytes partition of
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Parameter Value
Model of the CPU Intel Pentium 4
Clock speed of the CPU 1.6 GHz
Type of the hard disk Ultra ATA/100
Capacity of the hard disk 20 GB
Table 6.1: Physical Resource Parameters
buffer size 8M 16M 32M 64M 128M
height 7 6 5 4 3
overhead 70 60 50 40 30
Table 6.2: Overhead factor vs. Buffer size
the hard disk, where the size of the last level is 1GBytes. Besides, we use another
1GBytes partition as sorting space for reordering the oblivious storage. The sort
algorithm we adopt to resort each level of the oblivious storage is the external
merge sort.
We vary the agent’s buffer size from 8MBytes to 128MBytes, and see how it
affects the oblivious storage’s performance. Table 6.2 shows the oblivious storage’s
height and its overhead factor according to different buffer sizes. When the buffer
size is 8MBytes, the oblivious storage contains 7 levels, and its overhead factor is
70, which means it takes averagely 70 I/O operations to satisfy one I/O request.
When the buffer size is as large as 128MBytes, its height is reduced to 3, and the
overhead factor is reduced to 30.
The first set of experiments reads through the whole oblivious storage to mea-
sure the average access time for retrieving a single data block. We compare it
against the StegFS in [53]. Figure 6.7 (a) shows the results. The performance
of oblivious storage improves linearly with the size of agent’s buffer. Generally,
retrieving a data block from an oblivious storage spends 5 to 12 times of the cost
















































(b) Proportion of Overheads
Figure 6.7: Performance of Oblivious Storage
we utilized sequential I/Os.
As we have mentioned in section 6.3.2, the overhead of the oblivious storage is
composed of two parts - retrieving overhead and sorting overhead. In the second
set of experiments, we intend to gauge the proportion each of the two overheads
takes. Figure 6.7 (b) shows the contrast. Although the sorting overhead costs a
larger fraction of I/O operations, it incurs less time. As shown in our results, the
sorting overhead occupies less than 30% of the total access time. This is because
the sorting process mostly produces sequential I/Os on contiguous data blocks,
while the retrieving process performs random I/Os most of the time.
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6.4 DataCavern: A Computationally Secure Ap-
proach
While oblivious storage is unconditionally secure against traffic analysis, its process-
ing overhead would be unacceptable for many real-time applications. In practice,
user would prefer a computationally secure steganographic file system which could
achieve a more optimized performance but without losing effectiveness in protecting
hidden data. In this section, we introduce such a computationally secure system
named DataCavern. First, we outline a conceptual model of DataCavern and dis-
cuss its security properties in the face of various traffic analysis attacks. Following
that, we expand it into a concrete construction that can be implemented for prac-
tical applications.
6.4.1 Conceptual Model
As shown in figure 6.1, DataCavern contains two memories – the raw storage situ-
ated in an unsecure domain, and the agent’s memory in a secure domain. Similar
to the schemes in chapter 3 and chapter 5, the storage holds user data blocks and
dummy blocks that are filled with random bytes. The two kinds of blocks are in-
termixed randomly. The agent’s memory is for caching or shuﬄing blocks, with
the aim of transforming the data accesses into steg accesses on the storage that do
not display any statistical properties that point to the existence of hidden data.
The conceptual model consists of three components – a request mixer, a shuﬄer
and a buffer, each corresponding to a partition of the agent’s memory as shown in
figure 6.8.
The request mixer is used to reorder the user requests. When the agent receives







Figure 6.8: Conceptual Model of DataCavern
mixer is full, the agent reorders the requests there and sends them to the storage
for execution. If not enough requests are received within some specified time,
dummy accesses to randomly selected storage locations are added to the mixer.
This procedure, called request mixing, weakens the correlations among the user
requests. Although the request mixer increases the expected response time of an
access, the maximum throughput of the file system remains the same. A parameter
of the request mixer is its size Smixer; a larger mixer randomizes the access sequence
better but slows down the response time.
The shuﬄer is responsible for relocating the data blocks in the storage. Period-
ically, the agent randomly retrieves some blocks into the shuﬄer, and swaps their
content before writing them back. (In the system implementation section, we will
explain how related directory and index entries are updated.) This shuﬄing proce-
dure relocates blocks covertly, thus concealing any repeated access patterns. There
are two parameters for the shuﬄer – the size Sshu, and the shuﬄe frequency Fshu
(i.e., the frequency in which shuﬄing is performed). Naturally, the effectiveness of
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shuﬄing improves with Sshu and Fshu, at the cost of a concomitant increase in I/O
overhead in the file system.
After a data block is accessed, it is cached in the buffer in the hope of fulfilling
the next request without involving the raw storage. This cuts down the physical
I/Os on frequently used pages, thus reducing the risk of data blocks being exposed
through uneven access frequencies. The larger the buffer size Sbuffer, the more
uniform the access frequencies on the storage. Buffering also magnifies the impact
of shuﬄing by lengthening the distance between successive accesses on any given
data block. (This will be explained in detail shortly.)
Sometimes, the buffer may not be large enough to smoothen the access frequen-
cies sufficiently. Instead of using only main memory as cache, we then carve out
a portion of the raw storage for a (much larger) disk cache. As shown in figure
6.8, the raw storage contains a persistent data store, as well as a disk cache for fre-
quently used blocks in the data store. Data blocks in the disk cache are hidden the
same way as in the data store. Section 6.4.3 will give a more concrete construction
of the disk cache.
6.4.2 Attacks and System Security
Having introduced the DataCavern model, we now examine its security from the
perspective of an attacker.
Traffic Analysis Attacks
As explained in Section 6.2.1, the additional protection that DataCavern is designed
to offer, over existing steganographic file systems, is against passive attackers who
conduct traffic analysis on the channel between the agent and the storage. In other
words, an attacker’s decision on whether the storage contains any hidden files can
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be based only on the sequence of accesses observed on the storage. Assuming he is
aware that the agent introduces dummy requests into the request mixier especially
when there is no user activity, the decision is about whether the access traffic on
the storage are randomly generated or genuine. To determine this, the attacker
needs to know how genuine user activity may affect the statistical properties of
the access traffic, and devise an appropriate statistical test to differentiate between
data versus dummy accesses (see section 6.2.2).
The data accesses could exhibit many properties that seldom appear in random
dummy traffic. The most common and noticeable properties include:
• Non-uniformity. Blocks in the storage are accessed with different frequen-
cies; some very frequently, such as those blocks containing the index of a
phone book, while others only rarely. Yet others like the dummy blocks may
never be accessed.
• Sequential pattern. Blocks containing related information are accessed in
a particular order. Examples are sequential scans on a file, and index tree
traversals.
• Clustering. Blocks containing related information are accessed together. In
file systems and databases, data blocks are organized into files or tables, and
data accesses can thus be expected to cluster around those logical organiza-
tions.
Clustering is a more general form of sequential pattern, in the sense that in a
sequential pattern, the blocks concerned are accessed not only as a group but also
in a specific order. Since the request mixer already disrupts any ordering within a
pattern, we need only to focus on removing non-uniformity and clustering. These





Figure 6.9: Gaps in Access Sequence
test, serial test or gap test [43]. The basic idea is to surface the repeated patterns in
an observed access sequence, and compare their distribution against the expected
distribution of a random access pattern to decide whether they are indeed random.
In this paper, we assume that the attacker uses the gap test, which works by
examining the gaps between repeated occurrences of the same block access or group
of block accesses. However, our proposed scheme works for the other statistical tests
too.
Figure 6.9 illustrates the access gaps and the cluster gaps in an access sequence.
An access gap is the distance between successive accesses to the same block. A
cluster gap is the distance between adjacent clusters of accesses to the same group
of blocks. For example, in figure 6.9(b), block 1, 2 and 3 are always accessed in
close proximity, and can be treated as a cluster. In order to identify a cluster gap
in an access sequence automatically, we characterize it by two parameters: the
cluster range is the number of the consecutive blocks within a given cluster, while
the cluster similarity is the percentage of identical blocks between two clusters.
The cluster gap test examines the data accesses in two groups of range R; if the
similarity is higher than some threshold S, the gap between the two groups is a
candidate cluster gap. Intuitively, the higher the similarity, the more recognizable
they are.
Suppose that in a random sequence, a gap (either an access gap or a cluster
gap) of length r appears with a probability pr. Due to non-uniform data accesses
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or the existence of access clusters, a gap of length r may appear with a different
probability p′r in an access sequence. If so, the observed gaps would deviate from the
distribution of pr. The gap test thus utilizes the Chi-square test to check whether
the observed gaps follow the expected distribution of pr, and from there determine
the existence of data accesses. Below are two examples to illustrate the threat.
Example: Access Gap. Suppose that the raw storage contains 3 blocks. In a
random access sequence, each block has the same probability of 1
3
to be accessed. In
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Such differences can be picked up easily by the chi-square test, given a sufficiently
long access sequence. ¤
Example: Cluster Gap. In a storage of N blocks, for a cluster of range 4, the
probability of another similar cluster (with similarity larger than 50%) occurring






(N−2)(N−3) , (N À 72).
However, if each pair of blocks in the storage were always retrieved together in
data requests, the probability of a similar cluster occurring in data accesses would
become larger than 1/N , which is almost N
72
× p. This affects the gap length
significantly. For example, the probability of a cluster gap of length r in a dummy
access sequence is
pr = p(1− p)r








Again, such differences can be detected readily through the chi-square test. ¤
The approach that DataCavern takes to counter the gap test is to reduce its
accuracy by transforming p′r and pr to be as close as possible.
Suppose that p′r and pr satisfy
p′r
pr
≤ 1 + θ (θ is a small value). Based on the
chi-square test, we obtain the following inequality if the gap test attack is accurate











where χ2x is the critical value of the chi-square test, and n is the number of observed
gaps, which is proportional to the length of the access sequence.







































(1 + θ) (6.2)
In order that the Type I and Type II errors, α and β of the chi-square test do not
exceed the maximum tolerable levels Tα and Tβ, the attacker must guarantee the
following inference














does not hold. Otherwise, when Type I error does not exceed Tα, Type II error will
always be larger than Tβ. That is to say, there must be a {N0, N1, ..., Nt} such that
χ′2 < χ1−Tβ and χ






> χ2Tα − χ21−Tβ(1 + θ)
According to inequality 6.1, a more accurate gap test with lower Tα and Tβ







Formula (6.3) is a measure of the accuracy of the gap test. The larger the value
of Vt, the more accurate the gap test will be in distinguishing between dummy
accesses and data accesses. To counter the gap test, DataCavern should thus
transform p′r and pr to be sufficiently similar, so that an attacker must obtain
an impossibly long access sequence (i.e., n is arbitrarily large) in order to sat-
isfy inequality (6.1). This makes DataCavern computationally secure according to
Definition 2.
Effect of the request mixer
We expect the request mixer to have varying success in removing the three prop-
erties inherent in data accesses. Specifically, it has little effect on the non-uniform
access frequencies. An access frequency could still be as high as 1
Smixer
or as low as
1
Sstorage
× Fdummy, where Fdummy is the fraction of dummy accesses. However, the
mixer can transform most of the sequential patterns to weaker clustering patterns
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that are more difficult to detect, as explained previously. In addition, the mixer is
effective in dispersing access clusters; the similarity between the original clusters
would be reduced and, at the same time, the cluster ranges would be enlarged. As
an example, if the user accesses contain clusters of range 4 and 80% similarity; after
passing a mixer of size 8, those clusters would be dispersed to clusters of range 8
and 40% similarity. In general, clusters of range R (R < Smixer) and similarity S
would be transformed to clusters of range Smixer and similarity S × RSmixer by the
request mixer.
Effect of the shuﬄer and buffer
————————————————————————————————
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Figure 6.10: Post-blocks in an Access Sequence
In the process of shuﬄing, Sshu blocks are loaded into the shuﬄer, permuted
randomly and then written back. A logical block could thus be moved to many
possible physical locations, and become untraceable to attackers. To the gap test,
the gap between logical accesses become unidentifiable too, as there could be several
possible gaps for it in the physical access sequence. As illustrated in figure 6.10, in
an access sequence, there are many physical blocks from where a logical block could
be accessed again after shuﬄing; these are post-blocks of the previously accessed
block. If a post-block indeed contains the original logical block, it is a true post-
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block ; otherwise, it is a false post-block. Intuitively, as shuﬄing goes on, a logical
block could be relocated to more and more possible places, so its post-blocks would
become denser in the access sequence. In other words, posti, the probability that
a post-block occurs at the ith block after the original block in the access sequence,
increases with i. A larger shuﬄer and a higher shuﬄe frequency both accelerate
this increase in posti.
After shuﬄing, the access gaps can only be assessed through the post-blocks.
As each post-block can form an access gap with the original block, there could
be many possible access gaps in the access sequence, among which only one is
the true gap that measures the user access pattern while the rest are false gaps.
Without knowing the true gap, the gap test has to take all the possible gaps into
consideration, so its accuracy would be significantly reduced.
One reasonable variant of the gap test is to consider only the shortest of all the
possible gaps. As figure 6.11 shows, if the true post-block emerges before the other
post-blocks, the true gap is indeed the shortest one and is exposed by the gap test.
Otherwise, the true gap is hidden behind the false gaps and is not detectable by
this variant test.
Similarly, there could be several possible cluster gaps in the access sequence, and
the gap test can just consider the shortest one. As illustrated in figure 6.12, if the
post-blocks are sparse, there would be few false cluster gaps. Thus the true cluster
gap is likely to emerge first, and be caught by the gap test. However, when the
post-blocks are very dense, false cluster gaps would appear with high probability,
and the gap test is likely to miss the true cluster gap.
Denoting the length of the true gap by a, and the length of the shortest false
gap by s, we have p′r = pa=r × ps≥r + ps=r × pa>r and pr = ps=r. Applying formula
(6.3), the accuracy of the gap test becomes:
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(b) True gap is hidden
























Figure 6.11: Hiding Access Gaps
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(b) True gap is hidden































Proof. Suppose p′r denotes the probability that the length of the observed shortest
gap is r. Suppose the length of the shortest true gap is a and the length of the
shortest false gap is S. Then if the observed shortest gap is a true gap, then
r = a and s ≥ r. Otherwise, if it is a fake gap, then r = s and a > r. Thus
p′r = pa=r × ps≥r + ps=r × pa>r. For random accesses, as there are only false gaps,

























































Equation 6.4.2 gives an upper bound on the accuracy of the gap test. The right
hand of the equation can be split into two factors: [pa≤r]2 and [ps≥r]2/ps=r. The
accuracy of the gap test could be reduced by decreasing either factor: (a) According
to the above equations, a larger posti produces a smaller [ps≥r]2/ps=r. Recall that
raising the shuﬄe frequency accelerates the increase in posti, and therefore reduces
the accuracy of the gap test. (b) Caching the frequently requested data blocks
lengthens the true gaps and increases [pa≤r]2. Thus a larger buffer also lowers the
accuracy of the gap test. Together, shuﬄing and buffering can reduce the accuracy
of gap tests to an arbitrarily low level.
To summarize, the shuﬄer and the buffer are intended to hide the true gaps
among the false gaps. Increasing the shuﬄe frequency causes false gaps to occur
more rapidly, while enlarging the buffer lengthens the true gaps, thus increasing
the probability that the true gaps are hidden behind false gaps. Buffering is partic-
ularly important where data accesses so highly skewed that the true gaps of some
frequently accessed blocks are too short to be masked by shuﬄing alone. Besides











Figure 6.13: Organization of Data Store
6.4.3 System Implementation
Finally, we address various system issues in implementing the DataCavern model
in a practical file system.
Data store
Figure 6.13 shows the structure of the data store. Like the construction in [72], our
system stores user data blocks as well as dummy blocks that contain random bytes.
Both types of blocks are scattered randomly across the storage volume.
Each block comprises an initial vector (IV) and a data field. The data field
contains real data in the case of a data block, and random bytes if it is a dummy
block, and is encrypted by the agent using a CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) block
cipher with the IV as seed. Whenever the agent re-encrypts a block, it resets the
IV so that the content of the whole block changes. This enables the agent to carry
out dummy updates on any block, by simply altering its IV.
A hidden file is a set of data blocks that are organized in a tree structure, with a









Figure 6.14: Buffer System
access key FAK and the full path. Only with the FAK can the agent reconstruct
the file, starting with the file header. Similarly, all the dummy blocks are organized
in dummy files.
Each block in the data store, whether data or dummy block, is identified through
a file ID and a block ID. Since the blocks are periodically relocated by the shuﬄer,
the agent maintains an index in its memory for identifying the physical location of
any block and vice versa.
Buffer system
As explained earlier, the buffer is instrumental in reducing any non-uniformity in
the data accesses, and enlarging the access/cluster gaps of frequently used blocks.
When the available main memory is not large enough, we construct a hierarchy of
disk caches in a partition on the raw storage. The construction of the buffer system
is shown in figure 6.14.
Each level of the disk cache has a corresponding index, through which logical
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blocks can be located. After a data or dummy block is accessed, it will be cached in
the agent’s buffer. When the buffer is full, a block is eliminated from it, and pushed
into level 1 of the disk cache. When level 1 is full, some randomly selected block
will be relegated into level 2. With a k-level buffer, this process will be repeated
down to level k. Finally, when level k is full, some randomly selected block will be
dropped. Thus, while the disk cache as a whole acts as buffer for the data store,
internally each layer of the disk cache also treats the level above as its buffer. As
dummy blocks are also mixed into each level of the disk cache, the existence of data
blocks in the disk cache can be hidden from attackers.
In retrieving a data block, every layer is accessed once: The agent retrieves the
data block into the highest level, and issues random accesses in the lower levels.
The number of levels and the size of each level are tunable parameters. Assuming
a 80-20 rule, k = 2 (a 2-level disk cache) should be sufficient for distorting the data
access patterns. Our experiment results will confirm its effectiveness shortly.
Data processing algorithms
This section presents the data processing algorithms of the three components of
DataCavern.
As described in the conceptual model, the request mixer intermixes the genuine
data accesses and random dummy accesses before carrying them out on the storage.
The work of the mixer is described in the algorithm in figure 6.15.
While conducting data or dummy accesses on the raw storage, the agent also
shuﬄes the content of the raw storage periodically. The shuﬄing algorithm is
presented in figure 6.16. The data store, level 2 and level 1 are continuously shuﬄed
in a certain frequency. Instead of retrieving individual blocks into the shuﬄer, the
agent can divide the storage into larger shuﬄe blocks, each of which consists of
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func Mix ()
set Timer = 0;
when there is user’s request, then
push the ids of the requested blocks into mixer;
if mixer is full, then
reorder the ids in mixer;
execute the operations in mixer;
when Timer = 100, then
fulfill mixer with random ids;
reorder the ids in mixer;
execute the operations in mixer;
set Timer = 0;
func end
Figure 6.15: Request Mixing Algorithm
func Shuﬄe ()
pick Sshu blocks from the data store to the shuﬄer;
loop
shuﬄe;
write Sshu blocks back to the data store,
simultaneously pick Sshu blocks from
Level2 to the shuﬄer;
shuﬄe;
write Sshu blocks back to the level2,
simultaneously pick Sshu blocks from
Level1 to the shuﬄer;
shuﬄe;
write Sshu blocks back to the level1,
simultaneously pick Sshu blocks from
data store to the shuﬄer;
end loop;
func end
Figure 6.16: Shuﬄing Algorithm
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func Retrieve (Addr)
set Ret = 0;
if Addr is in the buffer, then
retrieve *Addr from buffer, set Ret = 1;
return Ret;
end if ;
if Addr is in Level1, then
retrieve *Addr from Level1, set Ret = 1;
else
retrieve a randomly selected block from Level1;
end if ;
if Ret = 1, then
retrieve a randomly selected block from Level2;
else if Addr is in Level2, then
retrieve *Addr from Level2, set Ret = 1;
else
retrieve a randomly selected block from Level2;
end if ;
if Ret = 1, then
retrieve a randomly selected block from data store;
else
retrieve *Addr from data store, set Ret = 1;
end if ;
push *Addr into buffer;
if buffer overflows, then
remove Sshu blocks from Level2;
pick Sshu blocks from level1 to the shuﬄer,
simultaneously, shuﬄe and write them into level2;
Replace the Sshu blocks in Level1 with
Sshu blocks in shuﬄer;
remove the Sshu blocks from shuﬄer;
end if ;
func end
Figure 6.17: Data Retrieval Algorithm
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several physical blocks, and retrieve an entire shuﬄe block each time. This produces
sequential I/Os that can improve performance significantly.
The algorithm for processing data accesses is presented in figure 6.17. As data
update and retrieval are performed similarly, we only give the algorithm for data re-
trieval. In this algorithm, block replacement is merged into the shuﬄing procedure.
This prevents attackers from tracing the logical blocks in the disk cache.
6.5 Experiments on DataCavern
To evaluate DataCavern’s performance and effectiveness in countering I/O traffic
analysis, we have implemented the scheme presented in Section 6.4.3, with the
parameters of the request mixer, shuﬄer and buffer modules being tunable. The
implementation is in C++, and mounted directly on a disk volume for the ex-
periments. User requests are simulated as sequential scans of data files, and the
activity on the disk volume is logged for subsequent statistical analysis to assess
the security of DataCavern. The platform we use for the experiments is an Intel
PC, the key parameters of which are listed in Table 6.3.
Parameter Value
Model of the CPU Intel Pentium IV
Clock speed of the CPU 2.6 GHz
Type of the memory DDR RAM
Capacity of the memory 1 GB
Type of the hard disk Ultra ATA/100
Capacity of the hard disk 80 GB
Table 6.3: Physical Resource Parameters
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Parameter Default
Block size 4 KBytes
Data store 1 GBytes
Disk cache level2 256 MBytes




Table 6.4: Workload Parameters
6.5.1 Effectiveness in Countering Traffic Analysis
The first set of experiments is designed to study the effectiveness of DataCavern
in reducing the accuracy of traffic analysis attacks. For this study, the system is
mounted on a disk partition of 1GB. The workload parameters of the experiments
are summarized in table 6.4.
We constructed 8192 data files in the data store, each 64Kbytes in size. Assum-
ing 80-20 rule, 80% of the user requests are targeted at 1024 of the files, another
16% at a group of 3072 files, with the remaining 4% going to the other 4096 files.
Each user request retrieves an entire file.
Our first experiment is intended to study how shuﬄing produces post-blocks.
We run the simulated workload described above, and record a 2560k-long access
sequence on the data store. We then calculate the probability of occurrence of
post-block in the 512K blocks after the original block, i.e., the value for Post1K
to Post512K . The shuﬄe frequencies used are 1, 2 and 4 times of 1/Sshu accesses,
where Sshu is the size of the shuﬄer. As shown in figure 6.18, the probability of
occurrence of post-blocks increases as shuﬄing goes on, because blocks are relocated
to more and more possible places in the storage space. As expected, a higher shuﬄe
frequency leads to a faster increase in the occurrence of post-blocks.














Figure 6.18: Effectiveness of Shuﬄing
We record a 2560k-long access sequence on the data store with buffering turned
on, and another 2560k-long access sequence without utilizing the buffer. Figure
6.19(a) charts the probability distribution of access gaps ranging from length 1K to
length 512K in the two access sequences, while figure 6.19(b) shows the probability
distribution of cluster gaps with cluster range of 128 blocks and similarity of 12.5%,
after passing through the request mixer (section 6.4.2). The results confirm that
buffering significantly lengthens both access gaps and cluster gaps.
Applying equation (6.4.2), we can derive the V value of any specific gap test
from the above results. From the V value and inequality (6.1), we can then compute
the minimum length of an access sequence required by an attacker to accurately
determine the existence of data accesses. The longer the access sequence, the more
expensive the attack, and thus the more secure the file system. The following ex-
periment is intended to study the computational cost of gap test attacks and the se-
curity of DataCavern. Assuming that in a gap test attack, an attacker uniformly di-
vides the gap lengths into 4 groups, namely
{
(0, 4K), (5K, 8K), (9k, 12k), (13K, 16K)
}
(as the smallest false gap rarely exceeds 16K), and uses a degree-3 chi-square test




































Figure 6.19: Effectiveness of Buffering
the gap length groups. We assume that the attacker’s maximum tolerable type I
and type II errors are Tα = 10% and Tβ = 10%.
Table 6.5(a) shows the approximate minimum computational cost of the access
gap test with various shuﬄe frequencies, with and without buffering. Table 6.5(b)
shows the corresponding cost for the cluster gap test. The tables confirm that
buffering and raising the shuﬄing frequency increase the computational cost of the
gap test significantly. For example, with buffering and a shuﬄing frequency of
2×, the cluster gap test needs a very huge access sequence that contains 3 × 1011
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*Cost is represented as length of the access sequence (in number of I/Os)
Fshu 1× 2× 4×
with buffer 4× 1014 9× 1016 2× 1022
without buffer 300 1000 20000
(a) Cost of access gap test
Fshu 1× 2× 4×
with buffer 1× 107 3× 1011 7× 1023
without buffer 10000 10000 1× 1014
(b) Cost of cluster gap test
Table 6.5: Cost of Gap Test
I/O operations, to achieve an accuracy of 90%. Therefore, with a combination of
buffering and shuﬄing, DataCavern can be fortified very effectively against traffic
analysis.
6.5.2 Performance Study
Having demonstrated the effectiveness of DataCavern, we now shift our focus to
its performance characteristics. For comparison, we use as baselines the oblivious
storage in section 6.3 and the StegFD in chapter 3 that has no protection against
traffic analysis. The former will highlight the cost savings achieved by DataCav-
ern, while the latter will provide insight on the overhead incurred to secure the
file system. Table 6.6 lists the notation for the various schemes, while Table 6.7
summarizes the workload parameters. Here, we construct data files ranging from
100Kbytes to 1Mbytes in size in the various file systems, and each query retrieves
a randomly selected file.
In the first experiment, we profile the performance of the various schemes against
different buffer sizes, by varying the agent’s memory size from 8 Mbytes to 64
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Parameter Meaning
DataCavern1|2 Our proposed scheme,
shuﬄe frequency is
1/Sshu or 2/Sshu
DataCavern8M |16M Our proposed scheme,
shuﬄe block size is 8
or 16 Mbytes
ObliStore Oblivious Storage
StegFD Stegnographic file sys-
tem in chapter 3
Table 6.6: File System Notations
Scheme Parameter Default
All Block size 4 KBytes
DataCavern Data store 1 GBytes
Disk cache level2 256 MBytes
Disk cache level1 64 MBytes
Buffer 4 ∼ 32 MBytes
Shuﬄer 4 ∼ 32 MBytes
ObliStore Bottom level 1 GBytes
Buffer 8 ∼ 64 MBytes
StegFD Disk volume 1 GBytes
Table 6.7: Workload Parameters
Mbytes. For the oblivious storage, its buffer occupies the entire agent memory,
while for DataCavern the agent memory is split equally between the buffer and
the shuﬄer. Moreover, the shuﬄe frequency of DataCavern is set to 1/Sshu or
2/Sshu; we shall denote these two versions as DataCavern 1 and DataCavern 2
respectively. And the shuﬄe block size is fixed at 16Mbytes.
Figure 6.20(a) plots the average I/O overhead of the schemes. The I/O overhead
of the oblivious storage is proportional to the height of its buffer hierarchy, which
reduces with a larger memory size. For example, in retrieving one data block, the
oblivious storage needs to execute on average 36 I/Os with a memory size of 64













































(b) Access Time vs Memory Size
Figure 6.20: Sensitivity to Memory Size
only 9 to 16 times more I/Os. We also note that DataCavern 2 is only marginally
worse thanDataCavern 1, because shuﬄing cost constitutes only a small fraction of
the total cost. Figure 6.20(b), which plots the average access time per block, shows
the performance of oblivious storage and DataCavern are not as poor as suggested
by their I/O overheads, because they are able to take advantage of sequential I/Os.
Even then, the two DataCavern variants still manage at least a 200% reduction in
access time over the oblivious storage.




























Figure 6.21: Parallelized I/O
storage by distributing its layers across several disks. Similarly, the I/Os of Data-
Cavern can be parallelized by distributing the layers of its disk cache on different
disks. If each layer is located on a separate disk, the access time on each disk
would be reduced to be very close to StegFD. This is shown in figure 6.21, which is
generated by averaging the access time on each layer. However, oblivious storage
may contain far too many layers (around 7 layers as explained in [72]), and thus
is not practical to be fully parallelized. This is especially so because, for the net-
work storage on different IP addresses, parallelization would significantly increase
the communication cost. As DataCavern contains only around 3 layers (including
the data store), its parallelization cost would be much more tolerable than that of
oblivious storage.
In the next experiment, we study DataCavern’s sensitivity to the shuﬄer by
fixing the agent’s memory at 16 Mbytes, while varying the shuﬄe frequency and
the shuﬄe block size. Figure 6.22(a) shows the average access time per block
as the shuﬄe frequency increases from 1/Sshu to 4/Sshu. Here, the access time
of DataCavern degrades only slowly with increasing shuﬄe frequency; this again











































(b) Access Time vs Shuﬄe Block Size
Figure 6.22: Sensitivity to Shuﬄing
6.22(b) charts the average access time per block, against the shuﬄe block size. As
shown in the figure, a larger shuﬄe block enables the raw storage to benefit from
sequential I/Os, thus resulting in improved performance.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose two constructions of steganographic file system that
are able to defend against traffic analysis on a shared network storage. Both of
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them mix dummy accesses into users’ data accesses to prevent data traffics from
exposing the existence of hidden files. Oblivious storage is a construction that could
completely hide user access patterns in data traffics, so it is unconditionally secure
against traffic analysis attacks. In contrast, DataCavern focuses on reducing the
accuracy of traffic analysis to achieve unconditional security. It employs a request
mixer to disrupt any logical ordering in the user access activity, a buffer to even
out the access frequency of different storage blocks, and a shuﬄer to minimize
repeating access patterns by relocating logical blocks. We show, through analysis
and experiments, that both constructions are effective in countering traffic analysis,
but DataCavern could achieve much more practical performance than oblivious
storage. Plus the scheme for countering update analysis in chapter 5, we believe
our work represents a significant advance towards extending the steganographic file




In this chapter, we summarize the contributions of this thesis and discuss future
work on steganographic file system.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
This thesis extended the prototype of steganographic file system in both its the-
oretical model and its applications. We proposed a model to generalize the pur-
pose, design and security of steganographic file systems. A set of steganographic
file systems were then constructed for various application environments that are
threatened by different level of risks. The proposed systems were implemented and
experiments results showed their effectiveness and potential for real world applica-
tions.
Steganographic file system could provide a stronger protection of data than con-
ventional mechanisms such as user access control and encryption by hiding data
files within physical storage. However, the existing proposals of system construc-
tions fall short of the requirements of a practical file system that is expected to
manage data reliably and efficiently. In this thesis, we first proposed StegFD, a
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steganographic file system designed for local systems such as PC and server with
local storage. It overcomes the weakness of previous system and satisfies the pre-
requests of a practical file system through ensuring data integration, preserving
an efficient storage utilization and achieving a reasonable performance. We imple-
mented StegFD as a real Linux file system and conducted experiments to evaluate
its practicality. We also constructed database components such as B-tree on top
of it to evaluate its potential for database applications. Results confirmed that
StegFD is a practical system that could be used in real world applications.
Thereafter, we attempted to push the application of steganographic file sys-
tem beyond local machines to other platforms such as distributed storage, storage
area networks (SAN) and storage service providers. As these platforms were con-
fronted with additional security threats that StegFD had not encountered, we had
to construct new schemes to handle these various threats.
First, we created a model to generalize the tasks of steganographic file systems
and their effectiveness in countering attacks. The model addressed how to divide
the activity space of a file system into secure and insecure domains to surface the
potential risks and how to determine whether a system construction could enforce
adequate security. It was frequently used in the subsequent chapters to design new
constructions of steganographic file system to defend various attacks.
Then, a steganographic file system was constructed to counter update analysis
attacks, in which attackers attempt to detect hidden files by analyzing the data
updates observed on the storage devices. This type of attacks is presented to storage
shared on open network, such as Data Grid, SAN and P2P storage, where attackers
are able to look into the storage space repeatedly to identify data updates. The
counter measure adopted by the proposed system is to continuously issue dummy
updates on the storage, so that attackers cannot deduce the existence of hidden
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files from the observed update operations. By relocating updated data blocks
periodically, our system successfully removed the patterns in user updates and
achieved unconditional security in countering update analysis.
Finally, we addressed traffic analysis attacks which aims to disclose hidden
files through analyzing access patterns in I/O traffics. Sometimes shared storage
systems are likely to be compromised and controlled by attackers, who can thus
monitor the activities of the storage devices to obtain useful information. A typ-
ical application scenario is a storage service provider which is not trusted by user
to keep data confidentiality. Thus, a steganographic file system constructed on
such a storage is faced with traffic analysis attacks. We proposed two schemes
of steganographic file system to defend against traffic analysis attacks. Similar to
the idea for countering update analysis, both schemes issue dummy accesses to the
storage to hide the existence of users’ genuine data accesses. Oblivious storage is
a unconditionally secure scheme that could completely remove user access pattern
in I/O traffics. DataCavern is a computationally secure scheme that aims to min-
imize the success rate of traffic analysis attack. We implemented/simulated the
proposed schemes and experiment results shows their effectiveness and reasonable
performance.
7.2 Future Works
Our future research directions could be classified as follows.
7.2.1 Performance Optimization
In designing the steganographic file systems proposed in this thesis, one criterion is
to ensure their performance to be acceptable for real world applications. While the
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proposed systems such as StegFD could satisfy the basic performance requirements
of a practical file system, they are still very inefficient in comparison with regular
file systems. Their common bottleneck is that the data blocks of a file are randomly
scattered across the storage space, such that the file has to be accessed through
random I/O operations, which is much slower than sequential I/Os for today’s
secondary storage devices. Can we improve the performance of steganographic file
system by transforming some random I/Os to sequential I/Os? How would the
transformation affect the security of steganographic file system? These questions
need to be answered in our future research.
7.2.2 Distributed Steganographic File System
The counter measures against update analysis and traffic analysis enable stegano-
graphic file system to be constructed on shared network storage that is exposed to
higher risks. However, the proposed schemes such as oblivious storage and Data-
cavern all require that data processing be conducted by the agent situated in the
local secure domain. The communication cost between the agent and the storage
space would be very high. This is acceptable to platforms like storage area network
(SAN) which has a high speed connection between server and storage, but unac-
ceptable to platforms like Data grid and P2P networks whose storage is scattered
over the internet. So, in our future research, we need to investigate whether it is
possible to finish some data processing on the storage side to reduce communication
cost. As the data processing activities on the storage side could provide avenue




DBMS has much more complicated structures and functions than a regular file
system. There could be many interesting problems if we design a steganographic
DBMS using the construction of steganographic file system. First, the access con-
trol in DBMS is much finer than that of file system. In steganographic file sytem,
a hidden object is either a file or directory. In steganographic DBMS, a hidden
object could be a row, a column or a record, which could be too small to be hid-
den individually. Second, DBMS need to be maintained regularly to keep working
efficiently and safely. With hidden objects, maintenance could become much more
complicated and difficult. Third, operations in DBMS are usually more costly than
that of file system. Examples include the data processing operations like sorting
records and joining tables. The performance of current steganographic file sys-
tems could hardly satisfy the requirements of DBMS. Hence, it is necessary to do
additional performance optimizations to build a practical steganographic DBMS.
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